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Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law |
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James Gibson [View as PDF]
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116 Yale L.J. 882 (2007)
Intellectual
property’s road to hell is paved with good intentions. Because
liability is difficult to predict and the consequences of infringement
are dire, risk-averse intellectual property users often seek a license
when none is needed. Yet because the existence (vel non) of
licensing markets plays a key role in determining the breadth of
rights, these seemingly sensible licensing decisions eventually feed
back into doctrine, as the licensing itself becomes proof that the
entitlement covers the use. Over time, then, public privilege recedes
and rights expand, moving intellectual property’s ubiquitous gray areas
into what used to be virgin territory—where risk aversion again creates
licensing markets, which causes further accretion of entitlements,
which in turn pushes the gray areas even farther afield, and so on.
This “doctrinal feedback” is not a result of changes in the positive
law but is instead rooted in longstanding, widely accepted doctrine and
prudent behavior on the part of everyone involved. And because feedback
is so ingrained in established law and practice, its various cures tend
to create more problems than they solve. In the end, however, subtle
changes in doctrine’s use of licensing information provide a
normatively neutral solution.
Read Professor Rebecca Tushnet's Response, Why the Customer Isn’t Always Right: Producer-Based Limits on Rights Accretion in Trademark.
Read Professor Wendy Gordon's Response, The ‘Why’ of Markets: Fair Use and Circularity.
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