Volume 115, Issue 4, January 2006
7
Tributes
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737
Marvin Chirelstein,
Monday, 30 January 2006
115 Yale L.J. 737 (2006)
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739
Michael J. Graetz,
Monday, 30 January 2006
115 Yale L.J. 739 (2006)
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745
Louis H. Pollak,
Monday, 30 January 2006
115 Yale L.J. 745 (2006)
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751
John G. Simon,
Monday, 30 January 2006
115 Yale L.J. 751 (2006)
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Articles
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756
Ariela R. Dubler,
Monday, 30 January 2006
115 Yale L.J. 756 (2006)
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court situates its opinion within the history of laws banning sodomy. Lawrence, however, is also part of another historical narrative: the history of attempts by federal lawmakers and judges to define the relationships among the genus of illicit sex, the genus of licit sex, and marriage. Viewed from this perspective, Lawrence marks the latest intervention in a legal conversation that began when Congress enacted the 1907 Immigration Act and the 1910 Mann Act, each of which prohibited the movement of women across borders--the former, international, the latter, interstate--for "immoral purposes." In the early twentieth century, through these provisions, lawmakers and judges constructed an isomorphic relationship between marriage/nonmarriage and licit sex/illicit sex. The "marriage cure" transported sex across the illicit/licit divide. But courts and legislators came to view these curative powers as a threat to marriage's place in the sociolegal order because individuals used marriage as a tool to evade legal penalties. Thus, they checked the powers of the marriage cure and, in so doing, uncoupled both parts of their original isomorphism. Lawrence represents the culmination of this process: the movement of a sexual relationship across the illicit/licit divide at least in part because it made no claim to marriage. This move reflects the persistent status of marriage as simultaneously powerful in its ability to confer legal privileges and to shield people from the dangers of sexual illicitness, and powerless to protect itself from the taint of those same illicit practices.
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814
Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis,
Monday, 30 January 2006
115 Yale L.J. 814 (2006)
Contract theory does not address the question of how parties design contracts under the existing adversarial system, which relies on the parties to establish relevant facts indirectly by the use of evidentiary proxies. In this Article, we advance a theory of contract design in a world of costly litigation. We examine the efficiency of investment at the front end and back end of the contracting process, where we focus on litigation as the back-end stage. In deciding whether to express their obligations in precise or vague terms, contracting parties implicitly allocate costs between the front and back end. When the parties agree to vague terms (or standards), such as "best efforts" or "commercial reasonableness," they delegate to the back end the task of selecting proxies: For example, the court selects market indicators that serve as benchmarks for performance. When the parties agree to precise terms (or rules), they invest more at the front end to specify proxies in their contract, thereby leaving a smaller task for the enforcing court. We explore the choice between rules and standards in terms of this tradeoff, and we offer an explanation for why contracts in practice have a mix of vague and precise provisions. We then suggest that parties can achieve further contracting gains by varying the procedural rules that will govern their disputes in court. We illustrate by examining provisions in commercial contracts that allocate burdens and standards of proof. If the parties can improve the cost-effectiveness of litigation in this manner, they can further lower contracting costs by shifting more investment to the back end through their increased use of vague terms. Although vague terms have fallen into disfavor with contract theorists, this Article offers a justification for their frequent use in commercial practice.
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Note
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880
Ruby Z. Afram,
Monday, 30 January 2006
115 Yale L.J. 880 (2006)
Early decision admission programs--which allow a student to receive early notification of admission in return for a commitment to attend a particular institution--enjoyed explosive popularity at America's institutions of higher education in the 1990s. Schools use the programs to stabilize class size and identify enthusiastic applicants. The programs, however, favor students who are wealthier and whiter than their regular decision classmates. This Note applies civil rights and antitrust principles to discuss serious legal concerns raised by early decision programs.
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