119 Yale L.J. 140 (2009). 

The vast majority of U.S. international agreements today are made by the President acting alone. Little noticed and rarely discussed, the agreements are concluded in a process almost completely hidden from outside view. This state of affairs is the result of a longterm transformation. Over the course of more than a century, Congress gradually yielded power to the President to make international agreements. Each individual delegation of authority relinquished only a small measure of power, while freeing members of Congress to focus on matters that were more likely to improve their reelection prospects. But the cumulative effect over time left Congress with little power over international lawmaking. As a result, the President is now able to make law over an immense array of issues—including issues with significant domestic ramifications—by concluding binding international agreements on his own. This imbalance of power violates democratic principles and may even lead to less effective international agreements.

To correct this imbalance, this Article proposes a comprehensive reform statute that would normalize U.S. international lawmaking by reorganizing it around two separate tracks. International agreements that are now made by the President alone would proceed on an administrative track and would be subject to what might be called the “Administrative Procedure Act for International Law.” This new process would offer greater openness, public participation, and transparency, but not overburden lawmaking. A legislative track would include two existing methods for concluding international agreements: Senate-approved Article II treaties and congressional-executive agreements expressly approved by both houses of Congress. In addition, it would include an expanded “fast track” process that would permit streamlined congressional approval of agreements. Together, these proposals promise to create a more balanced, more democratic, and more effective system for international lawmaking in the United States.

119 Yale L.J. 316 (2009). 

Existing accounts of early gay rights litigation largely focus on how the suppression and liberation of gay identity affected early activism. This Note helps complicate these dynamics, arguing that gay identity was not just suppressed and then liberated, but substantially transformed by activist efforts during this period, and that this transformation fundamentally affected the nature of gay activism. Gay organizers in the 1950s and 1960s moved from avoiding identity-based claims to analogizing gays to African-Americans. By transforming themselves in the image of a successful black civil rights minority, activists attempted to win over skeptical courts in a period when equal protection doctrine was still quite fluid. Furthermore, through this attempted identity transformation, activists replaced stigmatizing medico-religious models of homosexuality with self-affirming civil rights-based models. This identity transformation through analogy cemented gay rank-and-file perception of the social treatment they faced as unjust, and helped determine what remedies gays would seek. For example, defensive gay litigation of the 1950s soon gave way to the affirmative impact-type litigation of the civil rights movement. Similarly, in the image of the 1960s racial justice movement, 1970s gays began to pursue legal acceptance of gay marriage rather than first seeking intermediate relationship recognition. Thus, analogies and identity claims can be useful tools for perceiving and remedying oppression. They should, however, be tools that unite, not divide groups: gays and blacks, especially, should recognize their (contingent) commonalities, created as gays remade themselves in the image of blacks.