For historical work published within the past decade, see, for example, Gregory Ablavsky, “With the Indian Tribes”: Race, Citizenship, and Original Constitutional Meanings, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 1025 (2018); Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: Its Letter and Spirit (2021); Laura F. Edwards, A Legal History of the Civil War and Reconstruction: A Nation of Rights (2015); Eric Foner, The Second Founding: How the Civil War and Reconstruction Remade the Constitution (2019); Maeve Glass, Citizens of the State, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865 (2018); Christopher R. Green, Equal Citizenship, Civil Rights, and the Constitution: The Original Sense of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (2015); Martha S. Jones, Birthright Citizens: A History of Race and Rights in Antebellum America (2018); Kurt T. Lash, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship (2014); Kate Masur, Until Justice Be Done: America’s First Civil Rights Movement, from the Revolution to Reconstruction (2021); Kunal M. Parker, Making Foreigners: Immigration and Citizenship Law in America, 1600-2000 (2015); George Rutherglen, Civil Rights in the Shadow of Slavery: The Constitution, Common Law, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (2013); David R. Upham, The Meanings of the “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens” on the Eve of the Civil War, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1117 (2016); Ilan Wurman, The Second Founding: An Introduction to the Fourteenth Amendment (2020); and 1-2 The Reconstruction Amendments: The Essential Documents (Kurt T. Lash ed., 2021) [hereinafter Essential Documents].

See, e.g., David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 794, 843 (1987); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385, 1388 (1992).

See, e.g., Chester J. Antieau, Paul’s Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 1 (1967); Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 215-20 (1986).

Compare, e.g., Lash, supra note 1, at 13 (arguing that the only substantive rights guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause are rights enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution), with Barnett & Bernick, supra note 1, at 210-12 (critiquing Kurt T. Lash’s argument).

See, e.g., Foner, supra note 1, at xxiv-xxvi; William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine 123 (1998).

For further discussion, see infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. Although the concept of general citizenship has been forgotten, scholars have roughly identified the concept of general citizenship rights—that is, fundamental rights commonly held by Americans. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 153-58 (1998); Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1263, 1293-99 (2000); Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 32-55 (2007); Charles W. McCurdy, The Problem of General Constitutional Law: Thomas McIntyre Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, and the Supreme Court of the United States, 1868-1878, 18 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 1-12 (2020); William Davenport Mercer, Diminishing the Bill of Rights: Barron v. Baltimore and the Foundations of American Liberty 189-99 (2017); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 171, 171-72 (1992) [hereinafter Sherry, Natural Law]; Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127, 1157-58 (1987). But scholars have not situated these rights in the ternary taxonomy discussed here or explored their disputed relationship to general citizenship.

References to state citizenship appear in U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (“Citizens of different States”); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“Citizens of each State”); id. amend. XI (“Citizens of another State”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside”); id. art. I, § 2 (“Citizen of the United States”); id. art. I, § 3 (same); id. art. II, § 1 (same); id. amend. XIV, §§ 1-2 (“citizens of the United States”); id. amend. XV, § 1 (same); id. amend. XIX, § 1 (same); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (same); and id. amend. XXVI, § 1 (same).

See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. Jack M. Balkin has described a “tripartite theory of citizenship,” but that idea relates to three possible categories of rights that citizens might enjoy (civil, political, and social), not to the notion of general citizenship described here. Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 221-22 (2011).

As used in this Article, the term “local” citizenship rights does not refer to municipality-level rights. Rather, it refers to rights grounded in local law, in contrast to general law.

See, e.g., The Federalist No. 39, at 257 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (stating that the Constitution “is in strictness neither a national nor a federal constitution; but a composition of both”). James Madison was not referring to citizenship rights, but he was grappling with the underlying sovereignty issues that influenced views of citizenship.

The Founders often used the word “federal” to capture this notion. See, e.g., id. at 257. But “federal” today means “national,” so this Article uses the word “federative.” As used here, the term does not refer to the Lockean concept of “federative” powers, like the ability to levy war and make peace. See Michael W. McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King: Executive Power Under the Constitution 37-38 (2020).

Because this Article is a descriptive work of legal history, it cannot answer present-day questions of constitutional method. My point is that any effort to recover attitudes about fundamental law in the past must account for the undergirding assumptions that historical figures used to identify that law. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.

In other words, the controversies were, at heart, social-contractarian disputes over political identity, not textual disputes about the meaning of language. This point is well-recognized in recent historical scholarship concerning who belonged to the polity. See, e.g., Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship, at xxiii (1998); Gerald Leonard & Saul Cornell, The Partisan Republic: Democracy, Exclusion, and the Fall of the Founders’ Constitution, 1780s-1830s, at 4 (2019); Parker, supra note 1, at 4; Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History 6 (1997). But this literature often “treat[s] citizenship as a cultural construct involving civic participation rather than as a legal status.” Michael Les Benedict, “Membership of a Nation and Nothing More”: The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Narrowing of Citizenship in the Civil War Era, in The Greatest and the Grandest Act: The Civil Rights Act of 1866 from Reconstruction to Today 9, 9 (Christian G. Samito ed., 2018); see also William J. Novak, The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century America, in The Democratic Experiment 85, 92 (Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2009) (“Whereas modern citizenship involves a single, formal, and undifferentiated legal status—membership in a central nation-state—that confers universal and internal transjurisdictional rights upon its holders, nineteenth-century American governance was precisely about differentiation, jurisdictional autonomy, and local control.”).

1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 674 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).

Speech of Salmon P. Chase, In the Case of the Colored Woman, Matilda 19 (Cincinnati, Pugh & Dodd 1837).

See Jud Campbell, Fundamental Rights at the American Founding, in 4 The Cambridge History of Rights (Dan Edelstein & Jennifer Pitts eds., forthcoming 2023); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 Const. Comment. 235, 252-55 (1984).

See infra notes 159-161, 297-301 and accompanying text.

Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 505 (2006).

For further discussion, see infra notes 180-184 and accompanying text.

Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 210 (1858) (remarks of Rep. Bliss) (emphasis added). Following the usual convention, this Article quotes speakers even when their statements were reported by someone who likely did not create a word-for-word record. In considering the accuracy of the Bliss quotation, however, it is worth noting that his speech was extensively reported and was reprinted in an eight-page pamphlet. See Philemon Bliss, Citizenship: State Citizens, General Citizens (Washington, Buell & Blanchard 1858).

Much of this literature focuses on other issues, like who qualified for citizenship or what citizenship rights entailed. For recent reviews of the literature, see the bibliographic essays in Parker, supra note 1, at 231-43; and Edwards, supra note 1, at 177-89.

See James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870, at 248-49, 286, 331 (1978). James H. Kettner identifies the term “general citizenship” but treats it as a synonym for national citizenship. See, e.g., id. at 255-56, 261.

William M. Wiecek, The Sources of Anti-Slavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848, at 166 (1977); see also Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863, 888 (1986) (treating “general or national citizenship” as the same); Bogen, supra note 2, at 796 (“[T]he privileges and immunities clause . . . was solely concerned with creating a national citizenship.”).

Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics 341-46 (1978).

See, e.g., Novak, supra note 13, at 92 (“Federalism . . . wreaked havoc on the substantive articulation of a coherent conception of national citizenship rights. As the United States Constitution made clear, most privileges and immunities were products of state citizenship rather than national citizenship.”). As discussed in Part III, it is less problematic to attribute a consistently binary view of citizenship to Reconstruction-era politicians and judges. See, e.g., Foner, supra note 1, at 120, 134-35. But scholars have yet to explore how the lingering effects of the ternary view of citizenship shaped the thinking of Republicans, many of whom continued to embrace a ternary view of citizenship rights. See infra Part III.

See, e.g., Green, supra note 1, at 21 (identifying “general citizenship”); Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 61, 104 (2011) (“[T]he Comity Clause secured the rights arising from a general citizenship.”). For other examples, see supra notes 22-23.

See, e.g., Green, supra note 1, at 77 n.120 (distinguishing “national” and “state” citizenship rights); Hamburger, supra note 26, at 111 (claiming that Bingham “advocated black Comity Clause rights in terms of national citizenship”). For other examples, see supra notes 22-23. Other scholars have linked the Privileges and Immunities Clause to “interstate citizenship,” see, e.g., Smith, supra note 13, at 97; David R. Upham, Corfield v. Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1483, 1490 n.29 (2005), while also treating the Clause as having secured rights of “national citizenship,” see, e.g., Smith, supra note 13, at 152; Upham, supra, at 1502; see also Upham, supra note 1, at 1128 (associating Corfield with the “national privileges of citizenship”). It should be noted, however, that some of these authors may intend to use the term “national” only in reference to the geographic reach of the rights, rather than to suggest that the rights derived from national citizenship as such.

Richard L. Aynes and Maeve Glass both emphasize the federative dimensions of Article IV. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 57, 71 (1993); Glass, supra note 1, at 896-97. But they use a binary categorization of citizenship. See, e.g., Aynes, supra, at 69; Glass, supra note 1, at 918. Accordingly, both scholars consistently interpret references to “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” as references to the rights of national citizenship. See Aynes, supra, at 78-80; Glass, supra note 1, at 878-79, 891 n.115, 894 & n.127, 888-99 & 899 n.152.

Some scholars have emphasized the relevance of “general constitutional law” in diversity cases without considering its connection to citizenship or to the original design of Article IV or the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 6; McCurdy, supra note 6.

There is a huge literature on conflicts over state and national sovereignty. See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (2010); Jonathan Gienapp, In Search of Nationhood at the Founding, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 1783 (2021). Debates over sovereignty were not always dichotomous, see Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 Yale L.J. 1792 (2019), but this Article shows that even a dualistic framing of sovereignty did not necessarily correspond to a binary set of citizenship rights.

See discussion infra Section II.B.

See 2 The Works of John C. Calhoun: Speeches of John C. Calhoun, Delivered in the House of Representatives, and in the Senate of the United States 242-43 (Richard K. Crallé ed., New York, D. Appleton Co. 1853) (denying that one could be a “citizen of the United States” in the sense of being “a citizen at large”).

The Book of Allegiance; or, a Report of the Arguments of Counsel, and Opinions of the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, on the Oath of Allegiance 103 (Columbia, Telescope Off. 1834) [hereinafter The Book of Allegiance] (argument of Att’y Gen. Smith, better known as Robert Barnwell Rhett).

See, e.g., 1 Alexander H. Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States; Its Causes, Character, Conduct and Results 34-35 (Philadelphia, Nat’l Publ’g Co. 1868) (suggesting that “there is no such thing as being a citizen of the United States”).

For a discussion of “radical” abolitionists, see Harold M. Hyman & William M. Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law: Constitutional Development, 1835-1875, at 92-93 (1982).

See, e.g., Joel Tiffany, A Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of American Slavery: Together with the Powers and Duties of the Federal Government, in Relation to that Subject 87 (Cleveland, J. Calyer 1849).

Id. at 88.

See infra notes 267-268 and accompanying text.

On this view, states still had authority over local matters, like suffrage, but Joel Tiffany denied that these rights were citizenship rights. See Tiffany, supra note 36, at 95.

Speech of Senator Morton, Wyandot Cnty. Republican, Sept. 28, 1871, at 1.

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 293 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).

See infra notes 400-401 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 Geo. L.J. 1389, 1391-92 (2018).

Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). For evidence that Corfield was actually decided in 1825, see Gerard N. Magliocca, Rediscovering Corfield v. Coryell, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 701, 701 n.2 (2019).

See infra note 369 (collecting sources).

See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 2, at 1388; Wurman, supra note 1, at 102.

See Lash, supra note 1, at 168.

See Nelson, supra note 5, at 123.

Pamela Brandwein’s scholarship is a notable exception. See Pamela Brandwein, Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction 38-39 (2011). Brandwein does not identify a concept of general citizenship. Cf. id. at 38 (describing the Fourteenth Amendment solely in terms of “national citizenship”). But my argument dovetails with her challenge to the prevailing assumption that the federal enforcement of fundamental rights and the preservation of federalism were incompatible objects. For further discussion, including a proposed refinement to Brandwein’s thesis, see infra notes 387-389 and accompanying text.

Crucially, most anti-slavery activists agreed with Calhoun about the federative nature of Article IV. Before the Civil War, Tiffany’s nationalistic approach to citizenship rights was a fringe theory. See Wiecek, supra note 23, at 269 (observing that Tiffany was making “a strained argument, even for the radicals”); see also id. at 274 (noting that anti-slavery radicalism was politically marginal at the time, even though its “long-term impact was more substantial”).

For further discussion, see infra Part III.

83 U.S. 36, 76-78 (1873).

Along the way, this Article frequently grapples with other notions of citizenship and of citizenship rights, but my goal is not to provide a full treatment of those concepts. Moreover, this Article is limited to explicating how general citizenship rights shaped rights discourse in relation to their domestic operation within states, without addressing how those rights were understood in connection with foreign affairs or federal territories. Finally, this Article does not dispute that national citizenship was an “abstract and underdeveloped constitutional category” prior to Reconstruction. Novak, supra note 13, at 98. Some authors did recognize national citizenship rights. See, e.g., William Alexander Duer, Outlines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States 181 (New York, Collins & Hannay 1833) (“[A]s Citizens of the United States, [D.C. residents] are entitled to the benefit of all commercial and political Treaties with foreign powers, and to the protection of the Union, at home as well as abroad.”); 1 William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 81-82 (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825) (associating the “incidents to the character of a citizen of the United States” with “the right to the general protection and to commercial benefits at home and abroad, derived either from treaties or from the acts of congress”). But by employing the term “national citizenship rights,” this Article does not mean to suggest that such rights were historically prominent or well-defined.

My attention, then, will be on how Americans deployed rights talk—not on their motives in doing so. See Jud Campbell, The Emergence of Neutrality, 131 Yale L.J. 861, 872-74 (2022) (discussing this approach); see also Quentin Skinner, Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech Acts, in 1 Visions of Politics: Regarding Method 103, 118 (2002) (“[O]ur main attention should fall not on individual authors but on the more general discourse of their times. The type of historian I am describing is someone who principally studies what J. G. A. Pocock calls ‘languages’ of debate . . . .” (footnote omitted)).

For references to “general citizenship” or its cognates, see infra notes 143, 158, 185, 192, 271, 281, 289, 293, 295, 296, 328, 332, and accompanying text.

For further discussion, see infra notes 180-184 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., infra notes 312-313 and accompanying text. The term “general citizenship” also could take other meanings. In 1872, for instance, Senator Lot Morrill of Maine used the term “general citizenship” as a synonym for membership in the national body politic, see Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 2 (1872), while also recognizing what this Article calls general citizenship rights, see id. at 3-4 (referring interchangeably to “those rights and those privileges which are common to the citizens of the United States,” “the great and ample privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States to all the citizens of each State in the several States,” and “those common privileges which one community accords to another in civilized life”). Along these lines, it is worth noting that Americans often referred to the federal government as the general government. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 349 (1819).

See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.

As J.G.A. Pocock says, intellectual-history scholarship is

explicatory in the sense that it aims constantly to render the implicit explicit, to bring to light assumptions on which the language of others has rested, to pursue and verbalize implications and intimations that in the original may have remained unspoken, to point out conventions and regularities that indicate what could and could not be spoken in the language, and in what ways the language qua paradigm encouraged, obliged, or forbade its users to speak and think.

J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century 1, 10 (1985); see also, e.g., John W. Burrow, Intellectual History in English Academic Life: Reflections on a Revolution, in Palgrave Advances in Intellectual History 8, 22 (Richard Whatmore & Brian Young eds., 2006) (observing that intellectual historians can explore “the tacit rules and conventions and limitations of which speakers in the past were not, or were not habitually, conscious, and of which they did not therefore explicitly speak, as we are not usually consciously aware of, nor do we usually feel constrained by, the grammar of our own language”).

See, e.g., Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3d ed. 1996); 1 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (1978).

See, e.g., Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (2007); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, 1870-1920 (1997); Laura Weinrib, The Taming of Free Speech: America’s Civil Liberties Compromise (2016).

For a powerful recent example, see Jonathan Gienapp, The Second Creation: Fixing the American Constitution in the Founding Era (2018), which explores changes in how the Founders imagined the very idea of a constitution.

See supra note 59.

The binary distinction between these two mental states is stylized.

See, e.g., infra notes 143, 158, 185, 192, 271, 281, 289, 293, 295, 296, 328, and 332.

Prior to the Civil War, Americans often differentiated local citizenship rights and general citizenship rights, but national citizenship was mostly irrelevant to those debates, except in controversies over who qualified for general citizenship, as Dred Scott illustrated. After the Civil War, by contrast, Republicans came to view general citizenship rights as being tied to national citizenship rather than a distinctive, federative notion of general citizenship. As a result, constitutional debates did not explicitly focus on a ternary account of citizenship, even though that way of thinking was prevalent in Antebellum thought and tacitly continued to frame how some Republicans viewed general citizenship rights.

Latching onto this fact, Lash argues that the set of substantive rights that this Article calls “general citizenship rights” were rights of state citizenship, and that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to offer only relative security (i.e., nondiscrimination) for these rights through the “State Citizenship Clause.” See Kurt T. Lash, The State Citizenship Clause (Aug. 21, 2022) (unpublished manuscript), https:‌‌‌//‌ssrn‌.com‌/abstract‌=4196204 [https:‌//‌perma‌.cc‌/D2WJ‌-NCX3]. In my view, Americans often viewed substantive general citizenship rights as rights of state citizenship and as “privileges or immunities of United States citizens” (meaning rights of general citizenship, national citizenship, or both). Lash’s approach—which one might call “positivist”—implicitly denies that a single substantive right can be linked to multiple forms of citizenship. To be sure, a positivist would have little trouble imagining identically interpreted clauses in state constitutions and the Federal Constitution. But as a technical matter, the positivist would insist that those provisions secure different rights—rights supplied by state law and rights supplied by federal law, respectively. By contrast, the notion of general fundamental law made possible the idea that a single right (or set of rights) could attach to multiple forms of citizenship. For further discussion, see infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.

Thus, my term local citizenship rights maps onto Ilan Wurman’s term special citizenship rights. See Ilan Wurman, Reconstructing Reconstruction-Era Rights, 109 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023), https:‌//‌ssrn‌.com‌/abstract‌=4098064 [https:‌//‌perma‌.cc‌/WYE6‌-UWL3].

Moreover, some Americans acknowledged a general fundamental right of representation, even though jurists widely thought that out-of-state citizens lacked voting rights as a privilege of general citizenship under Article IV. For further discussion, see infra notes 160-168 and accompanying text.

Some historical figures might have thought that general citizenship was an aspect of national citizenship, or an aspect of state citizenship, rather than being a different form of citizenship. Some readers have thus questioned whether this Article should have adopted a binary framing of citizenship and a ternary view of citizenship rights. In my view, compelling reasons support treating general citizenship as a distinct concept using a distinct label. First, historical figures often used distinctive terminology to refer to general citizenship. Second, even when referring only to “United States citizens,” sources sometimes indicated that a person could be a citizen in one sense of that term but not in another. See, e.g., Report of the Judiciary Committee (1831), in Speeches, Congressional and Political, and Other Writings, of Ex-Governor Aaron V. Brown, of Tennessee 549, 555 (Nashville, John L. Marling & Co. 1854) (“[I]t is not intended, nor necessary to assert, that free persons of color are in no respect to be considered as citizens of the General Government . . . . All that is meant to be asserted on this subject is, that they are not meant by, nor included as citizens, under that clause of the Constitution which secures to each the rights and immunities of the several States.”). Third, the ternary framing helps account for a broad, overlapping consensus with respect to views of general citizenship; for instance, two people could agree in substance about general citizenship even if one viewed it as linked to state citizenship and the other viewed it as linked to national citizenship. Fourth, the ternary framing helps account for why views of general citizenship and general citizenship rights were relatively coherent and stable notwithstanding uncertainty about the concept of national citizenship. See supra note 53. Fifth, as argued throughout this Article, ideas of citizenship were linked to three conceptually distinct sources of authority: state sovereignty, national sovereignty, and the federative aspects of the Constitution.

Future work will evaluate modern payoffs in greater detail.