Administrative Law
Every Court Everywhere All at Once
Rulemaking agencies have always faced the risk of getting sued. But they have not traditionally faced the risk of getting sued for failing to discuss their risk of getting sued. They do now, thanks to Ohio v. EPA. This Essay traces that decision’s odd origins and troubling implications.
Railroad Regulation Reinterpreted
Freight railroading today is profitable but fails workers, consumers, and communities in serious ways. This Note argues that both the railroad industry’s financial success and its operational shortcomings are legacies of deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s and considers alternatives, some old and some new.
Congressional Intervention in Agency Adjudication: The Case of Veterans’ Appeals
Prevailing constitutional interpretation sees Congress’s role as legislative, but members of Congress frequently exert nonlegislative influence on agencies by intervening directly on individual claimants’ behalf. This Feature provides an empirical portrait of congressional intervention in veterans’ appeals through internal administrative data and discusses its implications for constitutional and administrative law.
Resurrecting the Trinity of Legislative Constitutionalism
From 1919 to 1969, the Offices of the Legislative Counsel in the Senate and House drafted precedential opinions to advise lawmakers on constitutional and subconstitutional questions. This Article lifts the curtain on this institution, revealing a hidden system that worked to reify congressional power and stymie a rising juristocracy.
The Lost English Roots of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
Using new archival research, this Article argues that notice-and-comment rulemaking emerged from a series of American transplantations of English rulemaking procedures. Yet, as this Article emphasizes, during the 1930s and 1940s Americans only partially adopted the English framework. The rejection of laying procedures implicates the legitimacy of our rulemaking system.
Turning Square Corners: Regents and Arbitrary-and-Capricious Review’s Distributional Stakes
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Regents, courts have intensified their scrutiny of agency reversals that upset the expectations of regulatory beneficiaries. This Note defends that development and situates it within an underexplored history of courts calibrating the stringency of their review of agency action to distributional concerns.
The Duty to Respond to Rulemaking Comments
This Essay examines the legal basis for the requirement that agencies must respond to significant comments they receive during a rulemaking proceeding, the pros and cons of that requirement, and how the requirement fits together with other principles of administrative law, including procedural fairness and standing to sue.
The Invention of Immigration Exceptionalism
Everyone believes that immigration law has been exceptional since its late nineteenth-century birth—insulated from judicial review by the Court’s creation of the “plenary power doctrine.” But early immigration law was actually ordinary public law. Recovering this reality has profound implications for scholars of immigration and public law alike.
The Past and Future of Universal Vacatur
Universal vacatur is a legitimate part of administrative law’s remedial scheme, not a judicial invention. This Feature traces universal vacatur from the pre-APA period through Abbott Labs. It also juxtaposes the case against universal vacatur with the new major questions doctrine, showing that both centralize power in the Supreme Court.
Ghostwriting Federalism
Drawing on interviews and historical accounts, this Article explains how federal agencies help states write legislation. Even as the Supreme Court has curtailed administrative power in the name of federalism, this Article shows how agency collaborations with statehouses may further values associated with federalism by encouraging accountability, deliberation, and experimentation.
Rationalizing the Administrative Record for Equitable Constitutional Claims
The APA’s conventional rules stem from traditional rules of relevancy for discovery, rather than a statutory mandate. The scope of evidentiary review for constitutional claims against agencies should be determined by decision rules for a particular claim, consonant with the underlying principles of the scope of review in administrative litigation.
The Accountable Bureaucrat
An elected leader’s control may seem essential to bureaucratic accountability. But the administrative state itself better secures accountability’s core values. As this empirical study shows, complementarity between civil servants and political appointees; officials’ scrutiny of each other’s work; and constant interaction with affected publics all promote deliberation, inclusivity, and responsiveness.
The Adjudicative State
This Feature identifies a foundational problem in modern administrative law. It argues that the Supreme Court’s dual commitments to unitary executive theory and separation-of-powers literalism are in deep conflict when it comes to agency courts. Recognizing this conflict advances debates about how the Roberts Court is transforming the administrative state.
Coordinated Rulemaking and Cooperative Federalism’s Administrative Law
Distilling patterns across cooperative federalism programs, this Article uncovers the distinctive cross-governmental administrative law—and the unusual rulemaking it facilitates—in our most consequential federal-state collaborations.
Remand Without Vacatur in a Changing Environment
A court reviewing unlawful agency action, in deciding whether to “remand without vacatur,” considers the two factors of legal deficiency and undue disruption. Surveying diverging approaches to balancing these factors in environmental cases, this Essay proposes a reframing of the test that draws on parallels with preliminary relief.
Deference, Delegation, and Divination: Justice Breyer and the Future of the Major Questions Doctrine
This Essay examines the major questions doctrine’s relationship to the administrative-law jurisprudence of a man who helped develop it: Justice Breyer. Born of Breyer’s proposal to bring nuance into judicial review of agency action, the doctrine has taken on a life of its own much different than what he imagined.
The Binary Executive
The Supreme Court is inventing a new brand of administrative law, in which the President holds all executive power, but the Court restricts and countermands agencies’ policymaking discretion. The Court thus takes a share of the executive power it assigns exclusively to the President. The result is constitutionally unsound.
The Jurisprudence of “Degree and Difference”: Justice Breyer and Judicial Deference
Justice Stephen Breyer’s context-specific approach to judicial deference has prevailed in Supreme Court’s decisions to an underappreciated extent. Now the conservative majority is moving toward a no-deference rule. But they are unlikely to ultimately succeed because institutional pressure that then-Judge Breyer observed will drive courts to nevertheless consider context-based factors.
The Administrative Agon: A Democratic Theory for a Conflictual Regulatory State
Scholars have long debated whether the administrative state is a democratic institution. This Article offers a new framework for analyzing this question—one drawn from agonistic democratic theory. It argues that agonism provides new grounding for the legitimacy of administrative agencies while also pointing to new horizons for reform.
The Majoritarian Difficulty
Many recent Supreme Court attacks on the administrative state have been rooted in an asserted effort to increase democratic accountability, or accountability to elected officials, whether the President or Congress. This approach neglects how the Constitution makes available a broader account of democracy that furnishes support for the administrative state.