Antidiscrimination Law
Defining the Protected Class: Who Qualifies for Protection Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act?
117 Yale L.J. 1215 (2008).
Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with Disabilities Act
117 Yale L.J. 992 (2008). Disability rights advocates and commentators agree that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has veered far off course from the Act’s mandate of protecting people with actual or perceived disabilities from discrimination. They likewise agree that the fault lies in the language of the statute itself and in the courts’ so-called literalist reading of its definition of disability. As a result, many disability rights advocates have pinned their hopes for doctrinal reform on the proposed ADA Restoration Act, now in congressional committee. Although the Act would likely be a boon to plaintiffs, its chances of passage are uncertain. This Article tells a very different story of the problem and its solution. I agree that blame should fall on the courts, but not for reading the statute too closely. Rather, they have not read it closely enough. A truly rigorous interpretation of the ADA would expose a structural ambiguity in the regarded-as prong of the disability definition, with important consequences for interpretation. Although this ambiguity is a basic one—the kind that we resolve every day without thinking about it—it creates what is in fact a nine-way ambiguity in the statute. The courts have to date overlooked all but one of a corresponding nine readings; the other eight are effectively lost. Drawing on ordinary intuitions about sentence meaning, and borrowing some basic conceptual tools from formal linguistics, this Article aims to make ambiguity in the regarded-as prong visible to the reader. This opens the door to invoking the ADA’s rich legislative history for the purpose of resolving the ambiguity. Such history favors a broad reading of the statute and would mark a departure from an era of increasingly narrow interpretation of the ADA’s disability definition. Thus, while it may be a surprising alliance to consider, formal linguistic rigor in the hands of civil rights advocates holds the potential to realign ADA jurisprudence with the statute’s purpose.
Realizing the Potential of the Joint Harassment/Retaliation Claim
117 Yale L.J. 120 (2007). This Note assesses the relationship between hostile work environment harassment and retaliatory harassment claims by reviewing several cases in which both claims were brought. It argues that courts have unjustifiably narrowed the reach of both claims by disaggregating harassment from retaliation in a variety of ways, including considering harassment that occurs after the discrimination complaint to be solely retaliatory, rather than both retaliatory and discriminatory; interpreting harassment to be motivated simply by personal animus rather than by a retaliatory or discriminatory purpose; and disaggregating explicitly racialized or sexualized forms of harassment from nonracialized or sexualized forms of conduct. This Note concludes by describing the potential of joint harassment/retaliation claims to respond to both status-based and conduct-based discrimination and by offering specific recommendations to courts for reaching an integrated understanding of the two claims.
Education, Equality, and National Citizenship
116 Yale L.J. 330 (2006) For disadvantaged children in substandard schools, the recent success of educational adequacy lawsuits in state courts is a welcome development. But the potential of this legal strategy to advance a national goal of equal educational opportunity is limited by a sobering and largely neglected fact: the most significant component of educational inequality across the nation is not within states but between states. Despite the persistence of this inequality and its disparate impact on poor and minority students, the problem draws little policy attention and has evaded our constitutional radar. This Article argues that the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes and obligates Congress to ensure a meaningful floor of educational opportunity throughout the nation. The argument focuses on the Amendment's opening words, the guarantee of national citizenship. This guarantee does more than designate a legal status. Together with Section 5, it obligates the national government to secure the full membership, effective participation, and equal dignity of all citizens in the national community. Through a novel historical account of major proposals for federal education aid between 1870 and 1890, I show that constitutional interpreters outside of the courts understood the Citizenship Clause to be a font of substantive guarantees that Congress has the power and duty to enforce. This history of legislative constitutionalism provides a robust instantiation of the social citizenship tradition in our constitutional heritage. It also leaves a rich legacy that informs the contemporary unmet duty of Congress to ensure educational adequacy for equal citizenship.
From Employment to Contract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor Workforce
116 Yale L.J. 170 (2006) The American workplace has undergone a fundamental transformation as businesses increasingly have replaced traditional employees with independent contractors. Yet many of these individuals fall outside federal employment law, including Title VII's antidiscrimination protections. This Note addresses the legal gap in coverage and proposes using 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a Reconstruction-era provision that forbids race discrimination in "mak[ing] and enforc[ing] contracts," to modernize the workplace antidiscrimination regime to cover these workers. Drawing on the history and original purpose of the provision, the Note proposes reforms to § 1981 that would leave it structurally, doctrinally, and theoretically sound.
Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment
115 Yale L.J. 1862 (2006) Lawrence v. Texas remains, after three years of precedential life, an opinion in search of a principle. It is both libertarian–Randy Barnett has called it the constitutionalization of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty–and communitarian–William Eskridge has described it as the gay rights movement's Brown v. Board of Education. It is simultaneously broad, in its evocation of our deepest spiritual commitments, and narrow, in its self-conscious attempts to avoid condemning laws against same-sex marriage, prostitution, and bestiality. This Article reconciles these competing claims on Lawrence's jurisprudential legacy. In Part I, it defends the view that Lawrence constitutionalizes what I call "metaprivacy": When societal consensus internalizes a breach of the historical legal divide between particular "conduct" and an associated "status," punishment of that conduct cannot be based on moral approbation alone. The Article then, in Part II, harmonizes this view of Lawrence's legacy with pre-Lawrence constitutional privacy doctrine and theory. Finally, in Part III, the Article applies this understanding of Lawrence interdoctrinally, to capital sentencing. The Article suggests that all that separates the impermissible moral judgments made by a legislature in prohibiting sodomy from the permissible--indeed, almost constitutionally required–moral judgments made during the sentencing phase of a capital trial is a preference for gays over other a priori criminals. Notwithstanding the obvious appeal of permitting such a preference, Lawrence provides no support for it.
The Unforeseen Effects of Georgia v. Ashcroft on the Latino Community
115 Yale L.J. 2112 (2006) In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court weakened the protections afforded to minority voters in jurisdictions covered by the section 5 preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). This Note highlights the fact that Georgia v. Ashcroft--a decision applicable to all minority voters--was based on selective statistical evidence drawn solely from the African-American community, ignoring consistent data indicating that Hispanics still need the robust protections originally afforded by the section 5 preclearance standard. With the reauthorization of the VRA fast approaching, the Note presents two strategies--one for Congress, one for courts--to remedy the problems that Georgia v. Ashcroft has created.
Grutter at Work: A Title VII Critique of Constitutional Affirmative Action
115 Yale L.J. 1408 (2006) This Note argues that Title VII doctrine both illuminates internal contradictions of Grutter v. Bollinger and provides a framework for reading the opinion. Grutter's diversity rationale is a broad endorsement of integration that hinges on the quantitative concept of critical mass, but the opinion's narrow-tailoring discussion instead points to a model of racial difference that champions subjective decisionmaking and threatens to jettison numerical accountability. Title VII doctrine supports a reading of Grutter that privileges a view of diversity as integration and therefore cautions against the opinion's conception of narrow tailoring. Grutter, in turn, can productively inform employment discrimination law. The opinion reaffirms principles of contested Title VII precedent and suggests how employers might use affirmative action to meaningfully integrate their workforces.
Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe
115 Yale L.J. 1186 (2006) In recent years, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has invalidated many income tax law provisions of European Union (EU) member states as violating European constitutional treaty guarantees of freedom of movement for goods, services, persons, and capital. These decisions have not, however, been matched by significant EU income tax legislation, because no EU political institution has the power to enact such legislation without unanimous consent from the member states. In this Article, we describe how the developing ECJ jurisprudence threatens the ability of member states to use tax incentives to stimulate their domestic economies and to resolve problems of international double taxation. We conclude that the ECJ approach is ultimately incoherent because it is a quest for an unattainable goal in the absence of harmonized income tax bases and rates: to eliminate discrimination based on both origin and destination of economic activity. We also compare the ECJ's jurisprudence with the resolution of related issues in international taxation and the U.S. taxation of interstate commerce, and we consider the potential responses of both the European Union and the United States to these developments.
Civil Rights, Antitrust, and Early Decision Programs
115 Yale L.J. 880 (2006) Early decision admission programs--which allow a student to receive early notification of admission in return for a commitment to attend a particular institution--enjoyed explosive popularity at America's institutions of higher education in the 1990s. Schools use the programs to stabilize class size and identify enthusiastic applicants. The programs, however, favor students who are wealthier and whiter than their regular decision classmates. This Note applies civil rights and antitrust principles to discuss serious legal concerns raised by early decision programs.
Affirmative Action's Affirmative Actions: A Reply to Sander
114 Yale L.J. 2011 (2005) I am grateful to Professor Sander for his interest in my work and his willingness to pursue a valid answer to the critical question of the effects of law school tier on bar performance. Sander's readiness to respond to my Comment demonstrates the importance of the questions at hand and his openness to progress on these issues. Fortunately, progress is possible, because, as I show here, the impressive-sounding points in Sander's Response violate basic methodological principles and are incorrect. Sander points to certain descriptive facts that my Comment does not dispute. Black students appear to fail the bar at higher rates than white students. It also appears that "blacks and whites with similar law school grades (when controlling for school and entering credentials) have virtually identical graduation and bar outcomes." However, these descriptive observations are irrelevant to the causal question of whether going to a higher-tier law school causes black students to fail the bar. As my Comment and this Reply demonstrate, black law students who are similarly qualified when applying to law school perform equally well on the bar irrespective of what tier school they attend. There is no evidence that affirmative action reduces the bar performance of the students it is designed to help. The descriptive facts Sander presents may account for some of the reasons for affirmative action, but they do not address the consequences of affirmative action. Here, I respond to each of Sander's points in turn. DATA SET (Other)
Mismeasuring the Mismatch: A Response to Ho
114 Yale L.J. 2005 (2005) Daniel Ho claims that if one tugs at a single strand of my analysis of affirmative action, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, the entire structure collapses. As I explain briefly in this Response, Ho is wrong. Ho seems to miss the central analytical framework of my article, is vague in his claims of bias, and offers an alternative approach that violates the very methodological precepts he lays out.
Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black Students To Fail the Bar
114 Yale L.J. 1997 (2005) In a widely discussed empirical study, Richard Sander concludes that affirmative action at U.S. law schools causes blacks to fail the bar. If correct, this conclusion would turn the jurisprudence, policy, and law of affirmative action on its head. But the article misapplies basic principles of causal inference, which enjoy virtually universal acceptance in the scientific community. As a result, the study draws internally inconsistent and empirically invalid conclusions about the effects of affirmative action. Correcting the assumptions and testing the hypothesis directly shows that for similarly qualified black students, attending a higher-tier law school has no detectable effect on bar passage rates. Part I clarifies the assumptions implicit in Sander's study and explains the inconsistent and indefensible premises on which it rests. Part II presents results from a reanalysis of the data, using alternative methods that correct and reduce the role of these unjustifiable assumptions. The reanalysis suggests that Sander's conclusions are untenable on their own terms. Part III concludes.
To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping
114 Yale L.J. 1613 (2005) Many studies have documented seller discrimination against consumers, but this Essay tests and finds that consumers discriminate based on the seller's race. The authors collected data on more than 1000 taxicab rides in New Haven, Connecticut in 2001. After controlling for a host of other variables, they find two potential racial disparities in tipping: (1) African-American cab drivers were tipped approximately one-third less than white cab drivers, and (2) drivers who are "rational" statistical discriminators would expect African Americans to tip 56.5% less than white passengers (African-American passengers are also 3.7 times more likely than white passengers to leave no tip). Both black and white passengers participated in the discrimination against black drivers. These findings suggest that government-mandated tipping (via a "Tip Included" decal) might reduce two different types of disparate treatment. First, mandated tipping would directly reduce the passenger discrimination against black drivers documented in this Essay. Second, mandated tipping might indirectly reduce the widely documented tendency of drivers to refuse to pick up black passengers.
Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and Community (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy)
114 Yale L.J. 1353 (2005) More than ever, urban school systems are segregated by race and class. While a chief cause of this segregation is the flight of white and upper-middle-class black families from predominantly black public schools, there is little discussion of white flight in contemporary education policy debates. Instead, our conversations frame the causes of and remedies for educational inequality in terms of racially neutral private choices. Describing this phenomenon as the "privatization of concern" for our children, this article critiques a narrow view of parental responsibility and care that justifies segregation by invoking the liberty of familial privacy. Employing narratives from his experience as a D.C. school board member and parent, Charles Lawrence calls for an expanded understanding of John Hart Ely's process-defect theory that recognizes the continuing influence of racism on school choice. He argues that our silence on the subject of race undermines the democratic process, and he suggests that breaking the taboo against candid conversation about race and racism is a prerequisite to the creation of the community of care envisioned by Brown v. Board of Education.
The Character of Discrimination Law: The Incompatibility of Rule 404 and Employment Discrimination Suits
114 Yale L.J. 1063 (2005) Disregarding the dictates of Federal Rule of Evidence 404, plaintiffs in discrimination suits routinely prevail on the basis of propensity proofs. Yet neither the parties nor the courts are to blame for these rampant violations. It is, instead, the dearth of evidence available to many discrimination plaintiffs that compels defiance of the ban. Courts therefore face two options: apply the Rule in an incoherent and disruptive manner, or consistently enforce it and effectively preclude these suits. Legislators should recognize the harmful effects of this incompatibility in the law and undertake efforts to reform this notoriously problematic Rule.
The Future of Disability Law
114 Yale L.J. 1 (2004) Since its enactment in 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has dominated discussions of disability law in the legal academy. While the ADA's achievements must be celebrated, the statute's limitations have become increasingly apparent. In particular, the statute appears to have had little, if any, positive effect on the overall employment of people with disabilities. That result has occurred, Professor Bagenstos contends, not because of the narrowing interpretations the Supreme Court has placed on the ADA, but because of the inability of antidiscrimination laws to eliminate the deep structural barriers to employment that people with disabilities face. Even the ADA's requirement of accommodation--which has been seen as a far-reaching expansion of the scope of civil rights law--operates in a way that is much more similar to traditional antidiscrimination laws than many commentators have appreciated. To eliminate the structural barriers to employment for people with disabilities, the government must do more than simply mandate that individual employers cease discriminating and provide accommodations; the government must adopt more direct and sustained interventions such as the public funding and provision of benefits. Indeed, activists "on the ground" have increasingly understood the importance of the social welfare system to achieving the goals of the disability rights movement. But if it is to be true to the disability rights movement, any turn (back) to social welfare law must seek to solve the problems of paternalism and oppression that advocates identified in an earlier generation of disability welfare programs. Professor Bagenstos hopes to show some of the ways that current social welfare initiatives pursued by disability rights advocates do and do not take account of these problems, and to highlight the dilemmas advocates face in relying on the social welfare system.
Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century
113 Yale L.J. 895 (2004) The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on criminal juries has overlooked an important piece of history. This is most notable in the context of its jury discrimination jurisprudence over the past twenty years. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using his peremptory strikes against a potential juror on the basis of race. Later, the Court extended Batson to a variety of related contexts. In Powers v. Ohio, the Court held that Batson applied even when the defendant and the juror were of different races, holding that a white defendant could challenge the discriminatory striking of black jurors. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination only by state actors, but in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Court held that private civil litigants were to be regarded as state actors when they used their peremptory strikes. The Court went one step further in Georgia v. McCollum, holding that even criminal defendants were state actors when exercising peremptories. These cases prompted disagreement among the Justices on important questions, including whether a juror's race might influence his view of a case. In Powers, Justice Kennedy flatly rejected such a notion, arguing that to accept it would be to recognize "the very stereotype the law condemns." His conclusion in Edmonson was similarly resounding: Our "progress as a multiracial democracy" mandates that litigants "satisfy themselves of a jury's impartiality without using skin color as a test." While Kennedy's position has consistently held a majority of the Court, Justice O'Connor has taken the opposite view: "We ought not delude ourselves that the deep faith that race should never be relevant has completely triumphed over the painful social reality that, sometimes, it may be." Also in dispute has been the question of whose rights are violated by discriminatory jury selection. The prevailing view, again pressed most vigorously by Justice Kennedy, is that there are three harms: to the defendant, to the excluded juror, and to the community at large. This rationale has allowed the Court to extend Batson to all parties in all trials, because whenever a litigant uses a discriminatory strike, somebody is harmed. Again, this view has been challenged, with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas arguing that only criminal defendants were meant to be protected by the rule against discriminatory strikes. In McCollum, for example, Thomas wrote that prohibiting a defendant from using race-based peremptory strikes "exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death." On its face, this line of cases evokes the legacy of Reconstruction, when racial inclusiveness on juries was a major constitutional and legislative issue. In deciding these cases, however, the Court has rarely examined debates from that period. This Essay attempts to provide what is missing from the Court's jury discrimination decisions: a discussion of how various parties during the antebellum and Reconstruction eras thought about juries, and especially how they thought about juries and race. In Part II, I focus on the abolitionists' views of the jury. I suggest that while the Court has traditionally recognized the primacy of juries to the political philosophy of the colonial era, juries became even more important during the abolitionist movement. Specifically, the abolitionists' struggle against fugitive slave laws deepened their commitment to jury trial--a commitment that had existed in some form since colonial times. The abolitionists' struggle also helped set the stage for developments during the Reconstruction era, the subject of Part III. During Reconstruction, I argue, the abolitionist belief in juries as protectors of liberty came under challenge. After the Civil War, all-white Southern juries refused to indict or convict white defendants accused of crimes against blacks. In response, Reconstruction Republicans did not abandon the jury trial. Instead, they worked to eliminate barriers to black participation in the legal system, with a view toward ultimately securing the right of blacks to serve as jurors. They had come to recognize that the exclusion of blacks from juries made it impossible to achieve justice in Southern courts. But just as important as the abolitionists' decision to end discriminatory jury selection was their reason for doing so. Blacks and Reconstruction Republicans were grappling with many of the issues that divide the Court today. One was the question of whose rights were violated by discriminatory selection. On this point, the historical record yields no single answer--different legislators took differing positions. But a common theme does emerge: The greatest legal injustice of the era was the failure to protect black victims of white violence, and most of the jury arguments were framed with that problem in mind. Consideration of this historical reality would go a long way to resolving the debate presented in McCollum, where the Court struggled over whether white defendants charged with assaulting black victims could use their strikes to remove blacks from the jury. Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun held that they could not, but in doing so he failed to refer to any of the evidence that protecting black victims from all-white juries was one of Reconstruction's goals. Blackmun's ahistoricism was matched by the revisionism of Justice Thomas, who argued in concurrence that protecting black defendants was the sole goal of Reconstruction. Again, as we shall see, the historical record says otherwise. On another question, the Reconstruction debates provide even greater clarity. Reconstruction Republicans would be quite surprised by the current Court majority's assumption that a juror's race is irrelevant to how that juror is likely to perceive evidence, evaluate witnesses, or make judgments in a case. Reconstruction Republicans' case for racially diverse juries was grounded in the understanding that people's life experiences were significantly influenced by their race, and that these experiences, in turn, often made a difference in how they performed as jurors. So while the current majority believes that eliminating jury discrimination must be predicated on the belief that race is irrelevant, Reconstruction Republicans fought to end jury discrimination because of their contrary belief that race is significant. Accordingly, I conclude by suggesting that if the Court were to give more attention to Reconstruction, it would find a basis for its jury discrimination holdings that is more firmly rooted in history and more consistent with the emerging empirical evidence about race and juries.
Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment Right To Discriminate
113 Yale L.J. 743 (2003) At the end of its 2001 Term, the Supreme Court settled one of the most contentious educational debates in recent history, ruling in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris that the inclusion of religious schools in a state school voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. There are, however, complex constitutional questions about vouchers that linger in Zelman's wake. This Note addresses one such issue that has only just begun to receive scholarly attention: Can states require private voucher schools--including religious schools--to comply with antidiscrimination policies, or would the enforcement of those policies violate the First Amendment rights of the schools? For example, could a state require a private school to admit racial minorities, women, and gays and lesbians as a condition for eligibility in a state voucher program? What if the school administrators object on principle--perhaps religious principle--to racial integration, coeducational schooling, or homosexuality? Doesn't the First Amendment protect the schools' views? The Supreme Court's jurisprudence does not provide easy answers to these questions, and the relevant body of case law is inconsistent. This Note seeks to make sense of the doctrine and to demonstrate that, as applied to private voucher schools, antidiscrimination laws can--and should--survive a First Amendment challenge. Part I provides a brief overview of the current status of voucher laws and proposals, and discusses the opposition of civil rights organizations to these laws. Part II then analyzes the free speech problems that may arise if states require voucher schools to adhere to antidiscrimination norms. I argue first that voucher programs are a form of "government speech through private actors," and that in such cases the Free Speech Clause does not preclude states from making viewpoint-based distinctions. The remainder of Part II deals with the possibility that courts will reject this analysis. I discuss the various constitutional tests to which courts may subject antidiscrimination requirements, and I argue that antidiscrimination policies should survive any of them. Because the Free Speech Clause poses the most complex problems for antidiscrimination policies, the bulk of the Note centers on this issue. Part III addresses issues raised by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and argues that religious voucher schools can also be bound to antidiscrimination policies without violating the schools' First Amendment freedoms. The only exception would be for clerical teacher employment disputes at religious schools; such suits are nonjusticiable due to a mixture of Free Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns.
The Sanitized Workplace
112 Yale L.J. 2061 (2003) One of American society's most cherished beliefs is that the workplace is, or should be, asexual. This ethic is a legacy of our historic commitment to a conception of organizational rationality that treats sexuality as irrational and unproductive--a conception that had come under challenge until sexual harassment law gave it a new lease on life. Using a historical and sociological analysis, this Article demonstrates that the law's focus on eliminating unwanted sexual conduct has provided added incentive and increased legitimacy for a managerial project of suppressing sexuality in the workplace. In the name of preventing sexual harassment, many employers are prohibiting potentially benign forms of sexual conduct, without attending to the larger structures of sex segregation and inequality in which genuine sex harassment flourishes. Employers have begun to impose strict disciplinary measures, costing many people their jobs or reputations and threatening employees' ability to form their own work cultures. Employers also increasingly ban or discourage employee romance, chilling intimacy and solidarity among workers of both a sexual and nonsexual variety. Evidence also suggests that employers sometimes use sexual harassment charges as a pretext for punishing employees for discriminatory or other suspect reasons, and employees are quicker to accuse coworkers of a different race, sexual orientation, or class whose sexuality threatens or offends them. Contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy, this Article argues, workplace sexuality is not always discriminatory or disruptive: Sexual conduct takes its shape and meaning from the larger organizational context. Sociological research shows that women who work in well-integrated, egalitarian settings often participate and take pleasure in sexual interactions--probably because their numerical strength gives them the power to help shape sexual norms to their own liking. Thus, rather than encourage employers to desexualize, we should encourage employers to desegregate. To create the incentive to do so, the law should make sex harassment easier to prove in significantly segregated and unequal work settings, and harder to prove in fully integrated and equal ones. At an even more basic level, legal actors and reformers must abandon the traditional definition of harassment as unwanted sexual conduct in favor of a broader focus on discriminatory conduct, because the emphasis on sexual conduct as harmful has given the law a "cultural tilt" that meshes well with the classical organizational view of sexuality as unproductive and motivates managers to extend the reach of the law within organizations. By the same token, the fact that managers can justify their actions with reference to a feminist-inspired body of law has facilitated their ability to implement overzealous sexual harassment policies. Thus, this Article's account of the development of sexual harassment law teaches that law makes a difference, but the difference it makes depends on how it interacts with larger institutional and cultural forces that will shape it in everyday life. Ultimately, it argues, those who seek to halt sanitization must offer a new vision in which sexuality can coexist with, and even enhance, gender equality and organizational rationality.