Volume
132
November 2022

What We Ask of Law

30 November 2022

abstract. A minimal, reasonably uncontroversial demand of any legal system is that it should stabilize a polity against both the chance hazards of ordinary violence and sudden blows of extraordinary, destabilizing misfortune. Law in the contemporary United States, though, has not so far abated the lethal toll of violent crime, the serial mass shootings of children, the endless flow of racialized police violence, or even the toll of insurrectionary violence shadowing democratic politics. The gap between law’s operation in practice and its ultimate aspirations toward social order—especially for the socially and economically marginal—offers a hint that something in our dominant working model of law, or its relation to an ideal of the rule of law, is awry or inaccurate.

This Book Review reconsiders some presently dominant assumptions about how a well-functioning legal system works in light of new evidence of how law has operated across a wide historical and geographic panorama. This exercise in historical and cross-cultural contextualization has implications for our choice of a sound working definition of law, and for a clear understanding of the latter’s relationship to broader rule-of-law ambitions. It also bears on whether law is likely to advance or retard emancipatory projects of social reform, especially those pertaining to racial injustice. The spur for this reconsideration is Professor Fernanda Pirie’s book, The Rule of Laws: A 4,000-Year Quest to Order the World, an extraordinary and ambitious effort to fuse historical, anthropological, sociological, and legal learning across continents and eras into a single narrative arc. Starting with the historical materials eloquently marshalled by Pirie, I refine a new “polythetic” definition of law that is distinct and different from the demotic definition of law commonly used in popular and juristic discourse alike. To illuminate its distinctive form and implications, I bring this polythetic definition into conversation with relevant elements of the leading jurisprudential theories of H.L.A. Hart and Lon L. Fuller. This is done with the aim of sparking new ways of thinking about the relation of law to the state on the one hand, and about legalistic aspirations of the rule of law on the other. In concluding, I consider the implications of the polythetic definition of law for one especially pressing contemporary problem—the question of how law relates to projects of maintaining racial hierarchies or realizing their reform.

author. Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, with research support from the Frank J. Cicero Fund. I am grateful to Fernanda Pirie, who graciously commented on a draft. Clifford Ando, Claudia Brittenham, Tom Ginsburg, Brian Leiter, and Frederick Schauer gave me invaluable comments on issues outside my very limited domain of expertise and saved me from embarrassing mistakes. Eric Eisner and Aaron Liskov both improved the piece with their close reads and comments, and the editors of the Yale Law Journal did marvelous work on both substance and form. All remaining errors are mine.

Introduction

Much is asked of law, but we seem of late to reap dismayingly scant returns. Take a minimal, reasonably uncontroversial demand. In its totality, a legal system should realize the Hobbesian sovereign’s prerogative of establishing civil order.1 It should stabilize a polity against the chance hazards of ordinary violence and also soften the blows of extraordinary, destabilizing misfortune. But, in the contemporary United States, has law succeeded at even these fundamental tasks? It has not had a visible constraining effect on serial mass shootings of children.2 It has not abated the lethal toll of violent crime,3 which remains balefully associated in the public mind with racial minorities.4 At the same time, it has done too little to stanch the seemingly endless flow of racialized police violence paid for and directed by the state.5 The insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, suggests that law no longer seems to “break the irregular rule of the street” to allow for the tedious civility of representative, democratic politics.6 Look beyond violence to larger threats to public order, and law’s ambitions fare little better. It played a questionable role in responses to the global financial crisis.7 Nor could it sustain a public consensus robust enough to combat the viral plague that has just taken more than a million American lives.8

Neither state nor private violence and disorder, then, is firmly circumscribed by the institutions of American law at present. To be sure, we do not reside in a Hobbesian state of nature. But for those most vulnerable to the accumulating costs of private and state violence—especially racialized minorities in the United States—that may well be rather cold comfort.9 To their weary ears, solemn praise for the law might well not ring true. To borrow from W.H. Auden, it may instead sound more like a tinnitus of “impotent grandfathers feebly scold[ing].”10

And yet, the encomiums for law and a related (but not identical) normative ideal of the “rule of law” keep gushing forth.11 For example, Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court—most recently Justice Gorsuch—rhapsodize “the rule of law” as preferable to the “rule of men.”12 Law, Justice O’Connor once intoned, guards against a government driven by “caprice, passion, bias, and prejudice.”13 Law, said Justice Scalia, lays the groundwork for “rudimentary justice.”14 It “protects the rights and liberties of all Americans . . . . [W]ithout the rule of law, any rights are meaningless.”15 Similarly, the rule of law is, for academic lawyers like Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “central to our political and rhetorical traditions, possibly even to our sense of national identity.”16 Fallon’s position echoes across the Anglophone world. In an influential book, the English Law Lord Tom Bingham concluded that “it is on the observance of the rule of law that the quality of government depends.”17 Bingham’s vision of “government . . . in accordance with established and performable norms” is indeed twice as old as our nation. It has been traced back to the thirteenth-century English jurist Henri de Bracton.18 Its influence perhaps reached an acme in 1975, when the preeminent Marxist historian E.P. Thompson pronounced that “the notion of the rule of law is itself an unqualified good”19—much to his fellow travelers’ chagrin.20

Underlying many of these endorsements of law, I think, is an implicit “folk theory” of how law—that is, how a well-ordered legal system, not just a single rule or enactment—actually works to produce the social good of the “rule of law.”21 I cannot point to a single place where this model is written down. It is not, to be clear, the famous jurisprudential concept of law offered by legal positivists working in the vein of H.L.A. Hart (to which I will return later).22 It is a demotic rather than formal understanding. As such, it often works as a pretheoretical presupposition that can be silently put to work by the conservative jurist, the liberal legal scholar, and the Marxist historian alike. Once set forth here, I hope it will resonate. Once stated, that is, I hope it will seem sufficiently intuitive to lay claim to a measure of generality as an operative presumption behind much everyday talk of law and its relationship to the rule of law.

I call the demotic, or folk, theory of law the “conveyor-belt model of law.” It has three elements, which correspond respectively to the moments of law’s production, application, and output. First, the law typically has a temporally distinct origin in an officially authorized source.23 This origin is known and fixed, both in time and institutional source. The law is hence capable of legitimation by its pedigree.24 Second, a cadre of specialized state actors, usually judges, later apply that law to disputes involving new facts and parties. Law therefore has not only a proper pedigree but also a proper armature.25 And third, applying that body of early forged law in new cases creates general benefits beyond the localized good of resolving a specific dispute.26 The larger good most commonly associated with law relates not just to predictability, but also to the possibility of binding powerful actors in a society, especially those wearing badges of state authority, in ways that foreclose capricious, whimsical, or self-interested action. This last result is often captured in the otherwise vague term “rule of law.”27 I call these three steps a “conveyor-belt” model because they together imagine a linear and unidirectional pathway from written law to judicial application, and then to a state characterized by the rule of law.

The image of a conveyor belt captures a motivating metaphor embedded deeply in the self-understandings of many actors within the American legal system. It formalizes, albeit in somewhat facile terms, what those actors believe themselves to be doing when they act out their roles in a formal legal system. It also captures one way in which a normative, evaluative element of some sort is irreducibly comingled into law’s description. Mere words, it implies, can and do enchain power. Mere parchment barriers hence work as a positive force for social good. This is not to say that law must meet a moral criterion to count as law.28 It is simply a claim that law is a social fact with “normative” force and hence desirable consequences.29 Specifically, the official act of following or enforcing a duly enacted piece of law creates a positive social good of the rule of law—that is, the binding of powerful actors by ex ante rules in ways that limit capricious or arbitrary conduct.

So, what’s gone wrong? If the folk theory of law is widely held and in good working order, why doesn’t law do its core job of constraining power and creating order
better?30 And why does this afflict the economically and socially marginalized most of all? There are, to be sure, obvious local and contingent reasons for law’s present shortfalls that have nothing to do with our working theory of law. Specific legislative and judicial choices elicit the structural conditions of public violence, distrust in the public-health apparatus, and poorly regulated security forces. Pick your poison. Yet these observable shortfalls in law’s ambitions invite the question not just of whether we are making bad policy choices (although we certainly are), but also whether our understanding of law as a ground for producing the rule of law is flawed or incomplete. Perhaps our expectation that law is a social technology capable of delivering certain social results is simply implausible. Perhaps we have overlooked law’s limitations by failing to grasp clearly some of its common constituent elements. Or perhaps we have just misperceived how law works in the first instance.

Picking up on that last possibility, my aim in this Book Review is to reevaluate some dominant assumptions about a well-functioning legal system in light of new evidence of how law operates across a wider historical and geographic panorama. With this analysis in hand, I hope to offer a new perspective on what makes law distinctive as a tool of social regulation, and thus to elucidate some of the consequences of a new model of law for current disputes in legal theory and contemporary legal debates. By moving away from parochial conceptions of law and instead asking what marks law as a transhistorical social practice, I further hope to make some progress toward understanding the relationship between law’s operation and the elusive normative ideal of the rule of law. In so doing, I hope to gain purchase on how law’s modal vectors facilitate some, but by no means all, kinds of social orderings.31 In particular, I ask whether law as a mode of social action is oriented toward the creation of hierarchy or more emancipatory projects. To be clear, I make no claim to explain all the shortfalls in our current social order.32 More modestly, I want to probe why our implicit conception of law might foster infeasible or misleading expectations.

Such queries are invited by Professor Fernanda Pirie’s 2021 book, The Rule of Laws: A 4,000-Year Quest to Order the World.33 As its title suggests, Professor Pirie’s book is an extraordinarily ambitious effort to fuse historical, anthropological, sociological, and legal learning across continents and eras into a single narrative arc. It begins in 2112 B.C.E. with a series of clay tablets inscribed with the Sumerian dynast Ur-Namma’s rules for his city.34 Among the temporally final elements of the book is the 2015 promulgation of an international agreement on cross-border sales under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).35

Unlike Pirie’s previous monograph on similar themes,36 The Rule of Laws is crafted for a nonspecialist audience. It does not foreground theory. But it can be profitably read alongside that earlier scholarship to extrapolate a more abstract “theoretical” claim about the modal elements of law as a social practice. In particular, it can be read for the light it casts upon the three critical moments of the conveyor-belt model: law’s sources, the institutional mechanisms through which it affects ordinary people, and its ensuing capacity to yield an enduring ordering of social relations.

By bringing our implicit, yet hegemonic, notions of law into conversation with Pirie’s work, I hope to broach questions about both the theory and the practical promise of law in relation to the rule-of-law ideal. To begin with, an effort toward deparochializing our understanding of law fleshes out ways in which the conveyor-belt model—which I have suggested lurks somewhere behind views of figures as disparate as Gorsuch, Fallon, Bingham, and Thompson—does not accurately or completely capture the actual sources, development, and modal operation of law. This model is, instead, at best contingent and at worst misleading. Pirie’s work also provides an empirically grounded perspective from which to reconsider other widely shared theoretical claims about law. Her analysis sheds light on the influential concept of law developed by H.L.A. Hart using his own distinctive brand of “descriptive sociology.”37 It also has implications for claims about the “morality” of law tendered by Lon L. Fuller.38 Engagement with Fuller’s work further casts useful light on the relationship between “law” and the “rule of law,” understood as a project for the constraint of state power. Finally, that definition’s implications for contemporary problematics of legality are worth exploring. I conclude by reconsidering the relation of law to one particularly important challenge to legality: the persistence and recreation of racial hierarchy and subordination in the American context.

It is helpful to unpack here the first of these points since it is central to much of what follows—that is, how the elements of law, and their relation to the rule of law, vary from the conveyor-belt model in subtle but consequential ways. In brief, Pirie’s work suggests that law indeed does have historically recurrent (albeit not invariant or necessary) characteristics. But the conveyor-belt model gets these wrong. Law, Pirie first shows, connotes rules of general application maintained by a hieratic caste. Second, it is recurrently characterized by an aspiration toward acontextual generality and atemporality. This aspiration may be best embodied in a written text. But such writings are not always or necessarily the source of law. Finally, law’s relation to the state and the practical fact of compliance is a contingent rather than a necessary matter.

This account differs from the conveyor-belt model along three margins. First, it identifies a subtly but importantly different source for law from the one assumed by the conveyor-belt model. Second, the relationship between the law and the state is not immutable in the way that the conveyor-belt model implies. Law is akin to ordinary commerce in that it can get along perfectly well without the enforcement and adjudicative institutions ordinarily associated with the state.39 Indeed, Pirie’s historical work suggests it is the state and those who aspire to its command that are the needier, and hence the overly dependent, party in this relationship. Finally—and in some tension with Pirie’s own conclusions—her empirical synthesis suggests that the relationship of law to the rule of law (again, understood as the project of constraining state power) is not straightforward or linear. It is inconstant and murky. Many social goods associated with the rule of law—for example, predictability, stability, and regularity—can be realized without law, and indeed without the state. And it is possible to envisage a legal system that neither constrains powerful state actors nor adds much predictability for its subjects. Such has long been true of one of the world’s great legal traditions in China.40 It is possible, therefore, to have law, as well as a powerful state, without much by way of the rule of law.

One obvious worry at the outset about this kind of analysis and these conclusions is methodological: how can historical materials, marshaled however extensively, speak to purely conceptual questions about the “nature” of law? Why should history fix the present semantic content of a term such as “law”? Even if covering laws or other generalizations can be derived from historical regularities about law, an effort to derive normative conclusions from them would seem to commit the naturalistic fallacy: it would derive normative prescriptions from social facts. A short answer is that law is a concept that does not, and could not, exist detached from the long run of actual social practices and patterns of expectations held by participants in legal systems.41 It is impossible to talk meaningfully of a “concept” of law independent of those practices and associated beliefs.42 Obviously, “law” refers to distinct arrangements across varied jurisdictions at different times. But even if the term “law” may translate in different ways in different nations at different times, Pirie powerfully shows that there are also characteristics that recurrently transcend historical contexts and, in consequence, are presupposed by the “ordinary usage” of the term “law” as a transnational and transhistorical referent.43 A society, in other words, does not use the term “law” in a vacuum. Rather, the understandings implicit in that term are unlikely to float free of earlier ways in which the term was used, or concurrent patterns of employment in other jurisdictions. As a result, reflection on the conditions of possibility of law and the rule of law can usefully begin with the study of what, historically, has recurrently been the case with law. This exercise is worthwhile in part because it can help us to get past parochial “ideas and procedures” keyed to present practice, which may cloud our perceptions and judgments.44 It allows us to reach a more realistic accounting of what we plausibly ask of law because we better understand what law is, and how it produces social effects.

Pursuing this wider enterprise, I frankly acknowledge that I risk losing sight of Pirie’s ambitions for her own volume and straying from the job of the reviewer: reviewing the book rather than deploying it as a footstool for my own aspirations. I hope to avoid that snare. Part I, in particular, engages closely with Pirie’s text in its riches and demerits alike. That said, I shall acquit my central obligation up front: as a work aimed at a nonspecialist audience, The Rule of Laws succeeds marvelously. Pirie’s narrative rarely flags or loses the reader’s interest. She deftly moves forward in time and space, darting across continents and jurisdictions without losing a singular narrative thread. She also avoids the facile parsimony that mars many other humanity-spanning histories for popular audiences. Hers covers an exhaustive breadth of human life with clarity and vigor but without cliché or condescension. No one scholar can be expert in all of the heterogeneous legal practices she touches. (Certainly, I’m not). So, one might well cavil with details or matters of emphasis.45 But reflect a moment on the absence of any general text on the history of law—let alone one encompassing four millennia within and also beyond the strictures of state building—and the magnitude of her accomplishment snaps into focus. It is little short of breathtaking.

Part I introduces The Rule of Laws, focusing on its implicit definition of “law.” Part II then derives from Pirie’s work a new, general accounting of law, which I call the “polythetic” definition. To be clear, I cannot ascribe this theoretical claim to her (or blame her for its flaws!), even though it flows from her historical assemblage. Part II also contrasts this definition with the conveyor-belt model. Part III considers implications of a polythetic definition for key elements of the leading jurisprudential theories of Hart and Fuller. I pay particular attention to the relation of law to the state and to the rule of law, because these are points on which the conveyor-belt model and the polythetic model of law sharply diverge. Finally, Part IV takes up one practical question—the relation of law to racial hierarchy and projects of racial reform—as a way of showing that a highly abstract account of law can nonetheless yield (modest) insight on its propensity for emancipatory ends.

1

See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 183-200 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (1651).

2

For a vivid statement of this point, see Alex Kingsbury, Gunman in __ Kills __, N.Y. Times (May 27, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/27/opinion/editorials/american-mass-shootings-texas.html [https://perma.cc/PG4M-YXYN].

3

See P. Jeffrey Brantingham, Jeremy Carter, John MacDonald, Chris Melde & George Mohler, Is the Recent Surge in Violence in American Cities Due to Contagion?, 76 J. Crim. Just. art. no. 101848, at 1 (2021) (noting a thirty percent rise in homicide rates in thirty-four American cities between 2019 and 2020).

4

On the association of race and criminality, see Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies, Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 876, 881 (2004), which explores “the extent to which Black faces are brought before the footlights of attention when the concept of crime is activated.”

5

See Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force, 127 J. Pol. Econ. 1210, 1213-14 (2019) (reporting racial disparities in both the use of nonlethal and lethal force of up to more than fifty percent); see also Paul Gowder, The Rule of Law in the United States: An Unfinished Project of Black Liberation 113 (2021) (“The bare fact of repeated police killings of Black Americans, especially when the victims are innocent of any crime and/or the police receive no consequences for the killing, is itself a challenge to the US’s self-conception as a rule of law state . . . .”).

6

Max Weber, National Character and the Junkers, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 395 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958) (1946). But perhaps a constitution born in an insurrection against imperial rule is unlikely to abate irregular political action. If that constitution fails to specify emergency powers to address antidemocratic movements, its capacity to address such shocks may well further be doubted. On the scope of democratic emergency powers in American law, see Aziz Z. Huq, The January 6 Insurrection and the Problem of Constitutional Guardianship, 37 Const. Comm. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 10-19) (on file with author).

7

On the legality of many responses to the 2007 to 2009 global financial crisis, see Eric A. Posner, Last Resort: The Financial Crisis and the Future of Bailouts (2018). The most direct confrontation between law and economic emergency came in the September 2012 decision by the German Constitutional Court to limit Germany’s participation in the European Stability Mechanism. See BVerfG, 2 BvR 1390, 1421, 1438, 1439, 1440/12, Sept. 12, 2012, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2012/09/rs20120912_2bvr139012en.html [https://perma.cc/N936-JGJW].

8

See Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. Times (Oct. 12, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/covid-cases.html [https://perma.cc/UN35-68B8] (recording 1,017,278 deaths from COVID-19 in the United States). On partisan divergences around pandemic-related measures, see Zalman Rothschild, Free Exercise Partisanship, 107 Cornell L. Rev. 1067, 1068 (2022).

9

This Book Review, and the book under consideration, focus on domestic rather than international law. The understanding of what it means to “comply” with international law is more complex and has been subject to competing narratives over time. See John Fabian Witt, The View from the U.S. Leviathan: Histories of International Law in the Hegemon (Nov. 30, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4014826 [https://perma.cc/E8NL-3NMS] (surveying the field).

10

W.H. Auden, Law Like Love, in Collected Shorter Poems, 1927-1957, at 154 (1966).

11

In many contexts, the ideas of “law” and the “rule of law” are used almost interchangeably, such that it is often difficult to see where one ends and the other begins. To avoid confusion, let me clarify that I use the term “rule of law” to capture our aspirations toward stability, predictability, and an absence of arbitrariness, at least when achieved via the use of law. I thus understand it as a public good created by and through law. This understanding of the term is broadly consistent with the way it is used in public discourse today.

12

See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2438 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1176 (1989) (offering a “dichotomy between ‘general rule of law’ and ‘personal discretion to do justice’”).

13

TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 475 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The association of the rule of law with the constraint of official action goes back to a Victorian legal theorist who was one of the early adopters of the term “rule of law.” See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 181 (10th ed. 1959).

14

Scalia, supra note 12, at 1179. Scalia’s point here is embedded in a larger argument about the desirability of rules over standards as legal norms. See id. at 1185 (“I believe that the establishment of broadly applicable general principles is an essential component of the judicial process . . . .”). But his identity theorem of rules with the rule of law is implausibly demanding of language. See Timothy A.O. Endicott, The Impossibility of the Rule of Law, 19 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 7-8 (1999).

15

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be C.J. of the United States).

16

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1997).

17

Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law 171 (2011).

18

John Phillip Reid, Rule of Law: The Jurisprudence of Liberty in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 5, 18 (2004) (quoting Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology 101 (1987)).

19

E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 267 (1975).

20

See Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 Yale L.J. 561, 566 (1977) (reviewing Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E.P. Thompson & Cal Winslow, Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (1975) and Thompson, supra note 19).

21

In this Book Review, I use the word “law” to refer to an “organized system[] of rules—that is, . . . social or political systems in which human conduct is governed in one way or another.” Jeremy Waldron, Positivism and Legality: Hart’s Equivocal Response to Fuller, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1135, 1139 (2008).

22

See infra Section III.A.

23

This assumption informs many complaints about judicial overreach. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 686 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be.”). This is the idea that the law comprises a fixed set of authoritative sources that bind judges.

This is one point (albeit not the only one) on which the conveyor-belt theory diverges from legal positivism: the claim in the text is not at all the same as the “sources thesis” in legal positivism, which holds that the “existence and content [of law] can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort to any evaluative argument.” Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 Monist 295, 296 (1985). Under the source’s thesis, law does not need to originate in an official source. It can emerge as custom and be recognized as such. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 44-49 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 1994) (considering customs as laws and concluding that law need not originate in a “deliberate law-creating act”).

24

The obvious exception to the conveyor-belt model at this step is the common law, which has long been understood as a “practised discipline of practical reasoning.” Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 588, 601 (Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma & Scott J. Shapiro eds., 2004); see also A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Second Series 77, 94 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973) (characterizing the common law as an unwritten “body of practices observed and ideas received by a caste of lawyers”). This is a second instance of divergence between the legal positivist’s view of law and the conveyor-belt model. The former can more easily accommodate custom and the common law. For a discussion of how the legal positivist model, but not necessarily the conveyor-belt model, can accommodate custom, see Neil Duxbury, Custom as Law in English Law, 76 Cambridge L.J. 337, 339-40 (2017). The discomfort many modern American scholars and jurists have with the common law likely has to do with the background force of the conveyor-belt model. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations, 106 Geo. L.J. 1825, 1833-34 (2018) (describing a “trend away from common law reasoning in foreign relations cases,” which is one of the most important redoubts of federal common law).

25

The Supreme Court often describes its relation to written law in these terms. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535-36 (1991) (noting that “the declaratory theory of law according to which the courts are understood only to find the law, not to make it . . . comports with our received notions of the judicial role” (citations omitted)).

26

See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 804 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“A judiciary capable of performing this function, owing fidelity to no person or party, is a ‘longstanding Anglo-American tradition,’ an essential bulwark of constitutional government, a constant guardian of the rule of law.” (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217 (1980))).

27

On this constraining understanding of the rule of law, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory 63-67 (2004).

28

Cf. Constantin Fasolt, History, Law, and Justice: Empirical Method and Conceptual Confusion in the History of Law, 5 UC Irvine L. Rev. 413, 442 (2015) (arguing that “there is no such thing as any law that can be followed or applied without judging the justice of that law”). But see H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 624 (1958) (“[T]here is, in the very notion of law consisting of general rules, something which prevents us from treating it as if morally it is utterly neutral, without any necessary contact with moral principles.”); see also infra text accompanying note 172 (arguing that leaders can claim legitimation on the basis of outcomes).

29

Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 30 (1999) (addressing the “normative understanding of law”).

30

I have set out my views of some of these local causes in Aziz Z. Huq, The Collapse of Constitutional Remedies (2021).

31

A related project of “law and political economy” challenges the suppression of “problems of distribution and power throughout public and private law.” Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 Yale L.J. 1784, 1791-92 (2020). That project takes law as a given and then follows the legal realists in tracing its formative influence on economic and political arrangements. My project here is to step back one further level of generality and ask if we really have a firm grasp on how law works and how it tends toward some but not other social arrangements. Generality, however, is necessarily purchased here at the loss of some predictive precision.

32

See supra text accompanying notes 2-8.

33

Fernanda Pirie, The Rule of Laws: A 4,000-Year Quest to Order the World (2021).

34

Id. at 17-18.

35

Id. at 431-32. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) example does not come at the end of the book, but it is the temporally final element of the book. I offer it just to clarify the temporal sweep of Fernanda Pirie’s argument, not because UNCITRAL plays a central role in that argument.

36

Pirie’s 2013 book prefigures several of the themes in The Rule of Laws in a more theoretical register. Fernanda Pirie, The Anthropology of Law (2013) [hereinafter Pirie, Anthropology of Law]. The specific relation of law to the modern project of state building is addressed in Fernanda Pirie, Law Before Government: Ideology and Aspiration, 30 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 207 (2010) [hereinafter Pirie, Law Before Government]. I also found useful theoretical orientation in an earlier introduction to a collected volume of anthropological studies. See Fernanda Pirie & Judith Scheele, Justice, Community, and Law, in Legalism: Community and Justice 1, 4 (Fernanda Pirie & Judith Scheele eds., 2014).

37

Hart, supra note 23, at v.

38

See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 660 (1958) (“To me there is nothing shocking in saying that a dictatorship which clothes itself with a tinsel of legal form can so far depart from the morality of order, from the inner morality of law itself, that it ceases to be a legal system.”). See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964) [hereinafter Fuller, Morality of Law] (developing this account further).

39

Trade, of course, long predates law. See Barry Hawk, Law and Commerce in Pre-Industrial Societies 14 (2016) (“Men and women in . . . nine pre-industrial societies engaged in commerce and trade . . . . [C]ommerce and long-distance trade came before states . . . .”).

40

Pirie, supra note 33, at 14.

41

See Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays on the Morality of Law and Politics 237 (1994) (emphasizing social understandings in accounts of law).

42

This is not a new position. For the classic statement, dating from 1884, see Rudolf von Jhering, In the Heaven of Legal Concepts: A Fantasy, 58 Temp. L.Q. 799, 802 (1985).

43

See also Kenneth Einar Himma, Do Philosophy and Sociology Mix? A Non-Essentialist Socio-Legal Positivist Analysis of the Concept of Law, 24 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 717, 733 (2004) (explaining how contingent linguistic practices of usage shape what we see as “law”). Kenneth Einar Himma, however, would criticize what follows here as “too thin” to establish an adequate concept of law. Id. at 737.

44

Bernard Williams, Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, 75 Phil. 477, 493 (2000).

45

To criticize Pirie on the ground that she makes omissions, I think, is a bit churlish: no one could tell a global history of law without some. But two omissions are so striking that it would be wrong not to note them at least in the margins. I also note a few missteps of fact.

First, Pirie’s account is rich when it comes to Europe, Asia, and (to some extent) Oceania. But it has almost nothing to say about the legal systems of indigenous groups of North and South America, and very little to say about the law of sub-Saharan Africa, and in particular the great empires of Asante, Mali, Songhai, and Zimbabwe. At least some of the precolonial African experience can be understood as covered by Pirie’s treatment of Islamic law. See, e.g., A.J.H. Goodwin, The Medieval Empire of Ghana, 12 S. Afr. Archaeological Bull. 108, 110-11 (1957) (discussing the use of Islamic law during the reign of Malian emperor Mansa Musa). But there is more to be said about precolonial African law. See, e.g., Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa 380-402 (2006) (briefly surveying that field and arguing for the existence of law in this period). On the pre-Columbian Americas, Pirie cites the European destruction of Aztec and Inca records to explain the lacuna in her narrative. Pirie, supra note 33, at 340-41. There are some accounts of Mesoamerican law on which she might have drawn, however. See, e.g., Jerome A. Offner, The Future of Aztec Law, in 2 Legal Encounters in the Medieval Globe 1 (Elizabeth Lambourn ed., 2017); see also Ignacio Bernal, Durán’s Historia and the Crónica X, Appendix, in Fray Diego Durán, The History of the Indies of New Spain 569 (Doris Heyden trans., 1994) (1581) (“Yet others made records of the laws . . . .”). Given the history of malign neglect of both Mesoamerican and African law, cf. Menski, supra, at 380 (noting the “barely hidden undercurrent of denial of African laws and their potential contributions to jurisprudence”), this is an unfortunate gap.

Second, as we will see, Pirie makes claims about the relation of law to the normative concept of the rule of law. The twentieth century, however, was indelibly scarred by regimes ostensibly characterized by law but which committed atrocities of catastrophic cruelty. How law operated under these circumstances provides important data in respect to some of the claims she makes about law’s normativity. Consider one preeminently evil regime: in early 1942, Adolf Hitler first told German judges that “the nation is not here for them but they are here for the nation,” and yet a month later barred Nazi officials from pressuring or interfering with any legal proceeding. Hans Petter Graver, Why Adolf Hitler Spared the Judges: Judicial Opposition Against the Nazi State, 19 German L.J. 845, 846 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Without minimizing the horrors of the Nazi regime, it seems fair to say that the latter had a complex relationship with law. The other example that would have been useful to address is Soviet law. See, e.g., Judah Zelitch, Soviet Administration of Criminal Law (1931). The law’s relation to normativity under the Nazi regime, of course, was raised in an important article by Gustav Radbruch, and then provided the seed for an important debate between Lon L. Fuller and H.L.A. Hart. Gustav Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (1946), 26 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 7-8 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 2006) (1946). For a subtle account of Radbruch’s thought, and Fuller’s reaction, see Stanley L. Paulson, Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch, and the “Positivist” Theses, 13 Law & Phil. 313, 323-24 (1994).

As to errors of detail, consider two that might be corrected in a subsequent edition: Pirie describes the Talmud as having “a section of the Hebrew Torah in the centre of a page . . . surrounded . . . with Aramaic commentaries.” Pirie, supra note 33, at 126. The Talmud, however, is composed of the Hebrew Mishnah and the Aramaic Gemara, which comments on the Mishnah. Morris Adler, The World of the Talmud 50 (2d ed. 1963) (“The Mishna was complementary to the Bible. Now an extension of the Mishna was developed. It is called the ‘Gemara,’ from an Aramaic root meaning ‘study’ or ‘instruction.’ The Gemara is sometimes also called Talmud, although the term Talmud is more generally applied to the entire Oral Law embracing both Mishna and Gemara.”). Further, Pirie states that the “Qaraite minority” of Jews “did not recognize the Torah.” Pirie, supra note 33, at 218. Rather, Qaraites recognized the Written Torah, but not the Oral Torah. Meira Polliack, The Karaite Inversion of “Written” and “Oral” Torah in Relation to the Islamic Arch-Models of Quran and Hadith, 22 Jewish Stud. Q. 243, 243 (2015) (“[T]he Karaites argued for the inauthenticity of Jewish oral tradition (‘oral Torah’), as a necessary complementary step to their reinforcement of written Torah.”). I am grateful to Eric Eisner for his insight into these points.


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