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422, slip op. (2019). 3. Id. at 31. 4. Aaron Kaufman, Gary King & Mayya Komisarchik, How to Measure Legislative District Com- pactness if You Only
legislative prescription of voting rules may be objectionable on constitutional grounds unrelated to entrenchment—if, for example, the Constitution happens to
quo. If extended to legal remedies, however, recognition of a constitutional default rule, and a concomitant judicial law-making power, would require
pretextual explanations. Standing alone, these new rules (and new justifications for old ones) have important consequences. But if the shift toward an
technical article intended for economists, we presented a formal proof of the proposition that, in all cases (symmetric or not), if a welfare
Posner argue, the court in Example 1 might assign liability if it assessed the validity of both claims in conjunction. The probability that claim A
of statutory interpretation have flourished since this statement, it remains the case that focus on congressional process is rare if not
health outlays through tax-favored individual account devices. If Congress ever formally transformed the Internal Revenue Code into a federal
Here, for example, is how Arthur Rip- stein puts it: Examples of harms that are not wrongful are . . . familiar . . . . If you build a better
familiar . . . . If you build a better mousetrap, I may lose customers; if you close your hotel, my neighboring restaurant may suffer; if you