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rights liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; states are not. Further, states enjoy broader antitrust immunity than their political subdivisions. It is also

A “Full and Fair” Discussion of Environmental Impacts in NEPA EISs: The Case for Addressing the Impact of Substantive Regulatory Regimes

the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1203, 1296

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Cal. Apr. 30, 2015) (pleading guilty to violations of antitrust laws for an agreement among the defendant and his coconspirators to fix poster prices

b.1002.Berry Gersen.1049

Presidential Control Versus Bureaucratic Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 269 (1990); Wood & Waterman, supra note

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indeed, little) judicial attention. In the words of the authors, “a litigant in an ‘important’ antitrust or securities case, one who is represented by

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dismissing an antitrust class action for failure to state a “plausible” claim); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (applying Twombly’s

00201 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2015) (pleading guilty to violations of antitrust laws for an agreement among the defendant and his coconspirators to fix

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economic opportunity and social mobility.” Under the common law and antitrust statutes, “freedom of contract” ended where “restraint of trade” began.15

e.716.Langberg.756

Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV

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USE POLICIES 45-49 (2001). 97. See, e.g., KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 13 (2003) (describing the