Search results for: "antitrust" (584 results)
economic opportunity and social mobility.” Under the common law and antitrust statutes, “freedom of contract” ended where “restraint of trade” began.15
Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV
USE POLICIES 45-49 (2001). 97. See, e.g., KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 13 (2003) (describing the
7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 45-61 (1993) (highlighting efforts by lawmakers to have Supreme Court settle political conflicts over slavery, antitrust
rights liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; states are not. Further, states enjoy broader antitrust immunity than their political subdivisions. It is also
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). 83. See JACOB MARSCHAK & ROY
In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1257 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[The defendant’s] liability as to each class member was proven through common
setting. Our simple game theory mode of analysis helps puzzle through these relationships. 115. For instance, in the antitrust context, collusive
factual and legal complexities of antitrust claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and supervision.”). Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S
note 120, at 572-76; Judith L. Maute, Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation Rules under Commercial Speech and Antitrust Doctrine, 13