Search results for: "moderate risk corruption" (57 results)
assume the risk of the optimal sanction, but, axiomatically, given the assumptions of the model, if sanctions are optimal and the prospective violator
polarization is not in us, but in our political parties; polarization in our formal politics is a corruption or distortion of the more moderate, centrist
; polarization in our formal politics is a corruption or distortion of the more moderate, centrist poli- tics that we would have if only we could find
this development is viewed as an unqualified good. Small donors are seen as purifying forces who will reduce political corruption and the influence
Theorizing the Rules 1758 1. The Descriptive Dimension: Can Consultation Confer Legitimacy? 1758 a. Strong Legitimacy Optimism 1759 b. Moderate
while moderate versions suggest that good process can at least mitigate ethnic tensions and the risk of violence by providing democratic legitimacy
Small donors are seen as purifying forces who will reduce political corruption and the influence of large donors, make politics more responsive to the
practice, that the legislator himself (or his allies) will fall subject to the law. That risk will moderate the legislator’s hostility or indifference to
ideologically extreme incumbents raise dramatically more from small donors than more moderate incumbents; indeed, these studies find that an incumbent’s
by introducing the risk of quid pro quo corruption and allowing candidates to evade the monetary and reputational costs of their own political speech