Volume
130
February 2021

Police Reform Through a Power Lens

8 March 2021

abstract. Scholars and reformers have in recent years begun to imagine new and different configurations for how the state can design policing institutions. These conversations have increased in volume and urgency in response to the 2020 national uprising against police violence, when radical demands born within social movements have gained steam—demands to defund the police, to institute “people’s budgets,” and to give communities control over the state provision of security. In recent years, within this time of foment and possibility, social movements have been proposing, creating, and sometimes establishing new governance arrangements that shift power over policing to those who have been most harmed by mass criminalization and mass incarceration. These recent pushes by social movements for power shifting surface a fundamental set of questions about the very purpose of police reform, adding a new way for scholars and reformers to think about the contours and objectives of the state’s provision of safety and security—what this Article terms the power lens.

This Article examines the movement focus on power shifting in the governance of the police at both the local and national levels. It fleshes out a three-part theoretical account of why the power lens is an important and necessary addition to how scholars and reformers view the regulation of policing. First, shifting power to policed populations is reparative, in the sense that it shifts power downward toward populations who have been denied political power directly as a result of the history of policing policies and practices in their neighborhoods. Second, power shifting is a means of promoting antisubordination, based on the idea that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups. Third, a power lens on police reform promotes a particular view of contestatory democracy, one in which democratic policing has as one of its objectives the facilitation of countervailing power for those subject to the domination of the state. Taken together, the power lens brings a critical eye to the ways in which the construction of the notion of “expertise” often denies agency to the people who most often interact with police in the streets and on the roads. More broadly, the power lens opens up discussions of reform to first-order questions about how the state should go about providing safety and security in our time, with or without the police as we know it.

author. Professor, Brooklyn Law School. For helpful feedback, thank you to Amna Akbar, Shima Baradaran Baughman, Rick Bierschbach, Sharon Brett, Bennett Capers, Tony Cheng, Erin Collins, Brenner Fissell, Barry Friedman, Trevor Gardner, Brandon Garrett, Bernard Harcourt, Benjamin Levin, Kate Levine, Kay Levine, Theo Liebmann, Larry Kirsch, Sandy Mayson, Jason Mazzone, Janet Moore, Jamelia Morgan, Alexandra Natapoff, Ngozi Okidegbe, Sunita Patel, Tony O’Rourke, Sabeel Rahman, Alice Ristroph, Anna Roberts, Shirin Sinnar, David Sklansky, Chris Slobogin, Cara Suvall, and Nathan Yaffe, as well as participants at the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Workshop, University of Chicago Public Law Workshop, Columbia Law School Faculty Workshop, Hofstra Law School Faculty Workshop, Illinois Law School Police Reform Discussion Series, Duke Law School Center for Science & Justice, Stanford Law School Faculty Workshop, Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Workshop, Vanderbilt Criminal Justice Roundtable, CrimFest 2019, Junior Criminal Justice Roundtable, Law of the Police Conference, and the Conference on Agency, Race, and Criminal Procedure at Wisconsin Law School. Thank you to the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Fund for financial support, to Annamarie Foster for excellent research assistance, and to Steffi Ostrowski, Derrick Rice, and the editors of the Yale Law Journal for their superb feedback and editing.

Introduction

The demands that emerged amid the 2020 uprisings against police violence and white supremacy brought into the national consciousness radical ideas for change in how the state should provide safety and security. There are demands to defund the police, to have the people decide how budgets are allocated, and to give communities control over how to define public safety. To look back just one year is to see how these visions are the product of long-term organizing by directly impacted people—especially Black, Latinx, and Indigenous people—pushing to create new visions of how to keep each other safe. In June 2019, for instance, Black Lives Matter Chicago and other local groups held a press conference to condemn the killing by Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers of five people of color in the previous thirty days. The activists issued a call to action, summarized in this tweet: “Defund, Disarm, Disrupt CPD and business as usual. #FightBack #CPACNow.”1 The last hashtag references a bill that had been recently reintroduced in the Chicago City Council to form the Civilian Police Accountability Council (CPAC), which would consist of civilians chosen through elections in each neighborhood district.2 As the activists supporting the bill have written: “Without taking power away from the police and the state systems that operate in complicity, nothing will change. We need community in control. It is our democratic right.”3 When protests erupted on the streets of Chicago in May and June of 2020, people were ready with their transformational demands. “CPAC NOW” became a ubiquitous sign and chant, often placed or chanted in tandem with a demand to defund the Chicago Police Department.4

In late 2019, a national coalition of grassroots groups led by people who are formerly incarcerated, the “People’s Coalition for Safety and Freedom,” took the 25th Anniversary of the 1994 Crime Bill as an opportunity to present a vision of national legislation that could replace that much-maligned bill.5 The new legislation would require the federal government to reduce its spending on the criminal legal system and invest instead in health, education, housing, and infrastructure.6 The People’s Coalition insists that new national policies be generated by “join[ing] forces with the people most harmed by policing, criminalization and incarceration.”7 The result is a call for a “People’s Process,” in which federal legislators would be required to conduct townhalls, workshops, and peoples’ assemblies on the impact of mass criminalization; hold in-district congressional hearings on the impact of the 1994 Crime Bill; and, ultimately, draft legislation based on the priorities of directly impacted people.8 These ideas reemerged in the summer of 2020, embodied in the BREATHE Act and the People’s Coalition’s continued work to engage in their own “People’s Process” to craft federal budgeting priorities.9

These two long-term collective efforts—locally, in Chicago, for community control of the police; and nationally, via the People’s Coalition, to repeal and replace the ’94 Crime Bill—represent two different scales of a growing emphasis within social movements: reckoning with police violence by imagining new forms of governance and policymaking in which power is shifted to those who have been most harmed by mass criminalization and mass incarceration. These calls for power shifting surface a series of questions about police reform and the governance of criminal legal institutions more broadly. One set of questions gets at the specifics of institutional design within governance arrangements. This is a subject that Sabeel Rahman and I take up in a parallel work, analyzing the elements of institutional design in local governance that can (or cannot) facilitate contestation, build power, and push back against the antidemocratic structures of laws themselves.10 But the movement visions of legislative and institutional change also bring forth a more fundamental set of questions about the very purpose of “police reform,” whether it is local, national, or somewhere in between. By concentrating on power arrangements and a particular form of contestatory democracy, these movements open up police “reforms” to new institutional arrangements with the potential to facilitate the defunding and even abolition of policing as we know it.

Underlying the contemporary movement demands for governance changes that include community control of the police and a national “People’s Process” is a critique of two leading ways of thinking about the objective of reforming the governance of law enforcement. The first traditional way of thinking about police reform is instrumental: reformers focus on policies that they hope will lead to particular outcomes traditionally associated with policing success—as examples, a reduction in reports of violent crime or a reduction in police use of unconstitutional excessive force.11 A second leading way of conceptualizing police reform focuses on building trust between the police and communities so as to enhance the legitimacy of the police.12 Often, the instrumentalist and the legitimacy approaches are combined in a manner that aims to strike a balance between the two goals, or to weave them together into one coherent method.13 In contrast to the instrumentalist approach or the legitimacy approach, the movement focus on governance and policymaking in police reform adds a different idea about what it means to regulate the police effectively. The reform proposals from movement groups surface the specific role that policing plays in denying people in highly policed neighborhoods their democratic standing and collective political impact. They advocate reform efforts to counteract the antidemocratic nature of policing. They focus on power.

Since the uprisings in Ferguson and Baltimore intersected with the formation of the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL), the last six years have seen far-reaching changes in how the public and legal scholars alike think about policing14—changes that have only intensified in the wake of the 2020 uprisings.15 These changes would not have been possible without the push from movement actors to recognize the racialized and subordinating history of policing in the United States.16 A number of legal scholars has argued recently that transformative change is necessary if we are to realize legitimate, fair, and equal means through which the state can provide security. For example, Paul Butler, Bennett Capers, and Tracey Meares have all called for us to think of police reform as a “Third Reconstruction,”17 implying a total shift in the way that the state provides security in the context of the history of racist and racialized policing. Amna Akbar, Monica Bell, and Barry Friedman have, in different ways, all called for a complete transformation in how we think about the path forward: For Bell, it is a focus on undoing the subordinating effects of racial segregation;18 For Friedman, it requires disaggregating the roles that we ask police officers to play in order to reduce harm;19 And for Akbar, it requires the reduction and elimination of the police footprint altogether.20 And a number of scholars have called for the “democratization” of policing, a rethinking in how we administer policing as much as in what our policies and priorities for policing should be.21

Even if these scholars disagree on what that “reconstruction,” “transformation,” or “democracy” would look like, as well as whether the institution of policing can ever be compatible with racial justice or public safety,22 there is a tentative agreement from many corners that large-scale transformation is necessary and possible. This tentative consensus creates an opening to imagine new and different configurations for how the state can organize policing specifically and the provision of safety and security more generally. Thanks to the radical visions of social movements, a vast range of possibilities stretches out before us, from cementing our current policing practices with improved specialization and increased resources, to abolishing our institutions of policing altogether. It is within this range of possibilities that some movement actors have begun to propose and create new forms of governance arrangements that shift power over policing to those who have historically been the targets of policing. Although many of these efforts remain relatively unrecognized in the public sphere, some have gained national attention in 2020, including calls to defund the police, efforts to institute people’s budgets that implicate law enforcement and community wellbeing, calls for community control over policing, and demonstrations of long-term mutual aid as an alternative to policing. In many of these proposals, one central goal of the “reform” is to shift power away from the police and toward policed communities.

In this Article, I identify the movement focus on power shifting in the governance of the police and provide an account of why we should incorporate the power lens into the array of objectives of “police reform.” This analysis consists of three theoretical arguments.First, shifting power to policed populations might be reparative,23 in the sense that it shifts power downward toward populations who have been denied political power directly as a result of the history of policing policies and practices in their neighborhoods.24 Second, power shifting might be a means of promoting antisubordination, based on the principle that “it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups.”25 Third, a power lens on police reform promotes a particular view of contestatory democracy, one in which democratic governance has as an objective the facilitation of countervailing power for those subject to the domination of the state. This view is anchored to a larger belief that direct forms of agonistic contestation are crucial for democratic justice,26 in part because it is our criminal legal system itself that, by definition, yields forms of domination and violence.27

Taken together, these ways of thinking about power shifting in policing—as reparations, as a method of antisubordination, or as facilitating contestation necessary for democracy—create a lens on policing that adds a critical layer to the dominant ways of thinking about the objectives of “police reform.” The power lens asks analytical questions separate and apart from traditional focuses on outcomes like crime rates, incidents of police violence, or a community’s trust in the police. Instead, it asks reformers to consider who has been and is in danger of being harmed by policing, and to connect that inquiry to questions about who has control over policing policies, priorities, and practices. It asks scholars and reformers to imagine what it would mean to set aside temporarily a desire to rely on traditional “experts”28 or even “evidence-based”29 practices—for it may be that lay people are not well-equipped to form policies and distribute resources in a way that leads to improvements in traditional police-reform metrics, like crime rates or trust in the police. Divorced from this focus on outcomes, the power lens brings a critical eye to the ways in which the construction of expertise itself denies agency to the people who most frequently interact with police on the streets and on the roads: most often, poor Black and brown people. One way to unearth this analysis is to examine the governance and policymaking proposals being put forth by social movement actors—people traditionally thought of as “nonexperts”—themselves.

Methodologically, this Article uses social movement visions of legal change as a starting point for asking broader questions about how we think about and study policing and the criminal legal system.30 In this sense, it is both descriptive and normative: it provides a descriptive account of a way in which some social movement actors are approaching reform, and then follows with a normative account of why scholars should take this approach seriously and weave it into existing scholarly accounts of the regulation of policing. When this view “from the bottom” is brought into scholarly discourse over the contours of police reform and police accountability, the resulting analysis expands the range of possibilities for how we approach goals such as justice and public safety.31

The power lens is rarely going to be, on its own, a complete way of approaching reform of the criminal legal system. Instead, it can be a complementary lens, one that must be separated out in order to be analyzed properly. In a sense, it is at the meso-level of police reform: concentrating on governance and policymaking arrangements rather than outcomes or policies themselves.

Indeed, there is no guarantee that a power-shifting arrangement in policing would on its own lead to any particular outcomes. Communities, however defined, are not monolithic,32 a reality that has become especially salient as communities of color have disagreed internally over the summer of 2020 about calls to defund the police.33 The result of power shifting in police reform could easily go in a very different direction than that envisioned by activists in Black Lives Matter Chicago or the People’s Coalition, the two movement groups that are at the center of the examples of the power lens that I examine in this Article. Community control of the police, for instance, might very well lead a particular police district to more police patrols, more arrests, more stops-and-frisks, and an increase in other tactics that are seen as “tough on crime.”34 Moreover, changes in top-level policies in police departments have no guaranteed effect on the behavior of police officers; changes in police department policies or even resources might not lead to widespread change on the ground.35 Such a result would surely frustrate activists who aimed to reduce or defund policing in their neighborhoods. But considering the normative value of this outcome would be a separate question from whether there had been a power shift in the course of the governance arrangement that led to this kind of policing. This Article attempts to engage in that separation between various lenses and levels of reform, giving the power lens the serious attention that social movements demand of us.

At the same time, it is through the process of demanding power that movement groups are able to put more radical demands—such as abolition—on the table of what is possible.36 It is no coincidence that the calls for power shifting that this Article describes come from abolitionist grassroots organizations, many of which organize under the banner of the Movement for Black Lives,37 and all of which have been engaging in collective projects to redefine public safety on their own terms, imagining and creating ways in which “we keep us safe” in a world without police.38 The analysis by these groups of the ways in which policing in the United States has mediated the oppression of people and communities on the basis of race, gender, and disability focuses on how policing is deeply intertwined with structural impediments to self-governance.39 Indeed, although there are plenty of disagreements between individual abolitionist groups about which method of power shifting is the best road to abolition,40 there is seemingly a consensus that power shifting is important and necessary to the larger abolitionist project, and it should be a part of “non-reformist” or “transformative” reforms.41 This is because abolitionist demands require contending with first-order questions about how the state should provide safety and security: Should it be through policing and prosecution and prisons or through state support of communities and responding to harm in other ways? By claiming power over the governance arrangements that lead to the distribution of state resources and agencies devoted to “safety,” abolitionist social movements are able to put these first-order questions on the table and then contest the answers to them in ways that traditional, consensus-based modes of reform have foreclosed.

The Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I present an account of leading ways of thinking about the purposes of police reform, each of which contrasts with the movement focus on power—what I term the power lens. Part II presents a descriptive account of the contemporary, social movement focus on power shifting as a central goal of police reform, using the examples of community control of the police and the push to adopt a “People’s Process” to write new federal legislation. Part III presents a theoretical account of the power lens, focusing on three justifications for it: a reparative view, an antisubordination view, and a view of contestation as necessary for democracy. In Part IV, I explore some implications of the power lens for how reformers should think about the governance and scope of policing.In particular, I examine how the power lens unsettles traditional notions of expertise in policing. I conclude by arguing that if scholars and reformers were to think about power shifting alongside other goals of reform, we could open up the terrain of reform to ideas and communities that are too often excluded from the conversation. Indeed, we could potentially open up our governance arrangements to contestation over the very existence of our institutions of policing.

1

[1]. See BLM Chicago (@BLMChi), Twitter (June 12, 2019, 2:25 PM EDT), https://twitter.com/BLMChi/status/1138875087577387009 [https://perma.cc/AZ6G-S52N]; see also Press Release, MacArthur Justice Center, Coalition of Community and Civil Rights Groups Call on the City, Attorney General, State’s Attorney to Address Escalating Police Violence (June 13, 2019), https://www.macarthurjustice.org/coalition-of-community-and-civil-rights-groups‌‌-call-on-the-city-attorney-general-states-attorney-to-address-escalating-police-violence [https://perma.cc/S5RQ-YCK8] (describing the coalition that “urged the Mayor and City Council to implement the Civilian Police Accountability Council (CPAC) as the only way to create meaningful community-based accountability and ensure those most impacted by police violence have the necessary role to transform the Chicago Police Department”).

2

[2]. See Matt Masterson, Chicago Alderman Renews Push for Elected Police Oversight Council, WTTW News (May 14, 2019, 1:49 PM), https://news.wttw.com/2019/05/14/chicago-alderman-renews-push-elected-police-oversight-council [https://perma.cc/AG78-2XN4]; The People’s Guide to an Elected Civilian Police Accountability Council, Stop Police Crimes (Mar. 2015), https://jcua.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CPAC_B-W_PeoplesGuide_March2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/A87S-G28G] (summarizing the proposed ordinance).

3

[3]. See BLMChicago (@BLMChi), Twitter (June 19, 2019, 12:11 PM EDT), https://twitter.com/BLMChi/status/1141377967484002304 [https://perma.cc/G6JV-JU4M].

4

[4]. See Curtis Black, Community Oversight or Control? Coalitions Meet on Competing Police Accountability Standards, Chi. Rep. (July 1, 2020), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/community-oversight-or-control-coalitions-meet-on-competing-police-accountability-proposals [https://perma.cc/EQ3T-5F99] (describing “thousands of Chicagoans in the streets in recent weeks demanding community control of police in the form of an elected Civilian Police Accountability Council”).

5

[5]. See Deanna Hoskins, Andrea C. James & Kumar Rao, Opinion, The ’94 Crime Bill 25 Years Later: It’s Time for a Reckoning, ColorLines (Sept. 30, 2019, 11:40 AM ET), https://‌‌www‌‌.colorlines.com/articles/94-crime-bill-25-years-later-its-time-reckoning-op-ed [https://perma‌‌.cc/MSW9-XH9Z] (announcing the formation of this coalition). On the 1994 Crime Bill, see Lauren-Brooke Eisen, The Complex History of the Controversial 1994 Crime Bill, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/complex-history-controversial-1994-crime-bill [https://perma.cc/7BPR-224G].

6

[6]. See Hoskins, James & Rao, supra note 5.

7

[7]. Id.

8

[8]. See Reckoning with Mass Criminalization and Mass Incarceration: A Proposal to Advance a New Vision of Public Safety and Dismantle the 1994 Crime Bill Through a Participatory People’s Process, Ctr. for Popular Democracy 5 (Sept. 2019) [hereinafter Reckoning with Mass Criminalization], https://secureservercdn.net/198.71.233.150/yjt.eea.myftpupload.com/wp-content‌‌/uploads/2020/07/94-Violent-Crime-Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DEK-KS82].

9

[9]. See The BREATHE Act, Movement for Black Lives (July 2020), https://breatheact.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/The-BREATHE-Act-PDF_FINAL3-1.pdf [https://perma‌‌‌.cc/832D-SVZJ]; People’s Process, People’s Coalition for Safety and Freedom, http://‌‌‌‌safetyandfreedom.org/a-peoples-process [https://perma.cc/LQ24-5Z24]; People’s Coalition for Safety and Freedom (@Ppls_Coalition), Twitter (July 15, 2020, 4:24 PM EDT), https://twitter.com/Ppls_Coalition/status/1283497591012040706 [https://perma.cc/YEM6-KS4M].

10

[10]. See K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of Community Control, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 679 (2020). What we do not do, however, is provide a broader theoretical account of why shifting power should be a goal of police reform specifically.

11

[11]. See, e.g., Nat’l Acads. of Sci., Eng’g & Med., Proactive Policing: Effects on Crime Communities 119-32 (David Weisburd & Malay K. Majmundar eds., 2018) (describing how to measure reductions in crime and disorder associated with policing); cf. Nat’l Inst. of Just., Overview of Police Use of Force, U.S. Dep’t Just. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/overview-police-use-force [https://perma.cc/34C9-WAJD] (discussing the difficulties that arise from measuring police use of excessive force).

12

[12]. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, The Path Forward: Improving the Dynamics of Community-Police Relationships to Achieve Effective Law Enforcement Policies, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 1355, 1361-68 (2017); Final Report, President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 9-18 (May 2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML3G-GG9J].

13

[13]. See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, Increasing Police Accountability: Restoring Trust and Legitimacy Through the Appointment of Independent Prosecutors, 49 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 137, 158 (2015) (describing the goal of reform as finding a combination of ways to “effectively restore trust and reduce police violence”); Leadership, Nat’l Initiative for Building Community Trust & Just., https://trustandjustice.org/about/leadership [https://perma.cc/J8VS-MV8S] (describing the organization’s mission to promote “the best of law enforcement and community-driven approaches to improve public safety, minimize arrests and incarceration, enhance police legitimacy, and rebuild relationships between law enforcement and distressed communities”); President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, supra note 12, at iii (combining instrumental ideas about outcomes with reforms focused on increasing trust between police and communities); cf. Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 Duke L.J. 839, 852 (2019) (“[T]ransparency is a core reform suggestion in almost every recent scholarly proposal regarding policing problems.”).

14

[14]. See Samuel Walker, “Not Dead Yet”: The National Police Crisis, A New Conversation About Policing, and the Prospects for Accountability-Related Police Reform, 2018 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1777, 1782-83 (describing the “National Police Crisis” after the 2014 events in Ferguson and the creation of a “New Conversation” about police reform).

15

[15]. For just a small sample of legal scholars engaging with new ideas around police reform in the summer of 2020, see, for example, Monica Bell, Black Security and the Conundrum of Policing, Just Security (July 15, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71418/black-security-and-the-conundrum-of-policing [https://perma.cc/FWY6-NMHX]; Barry Friedman, Brandon L. Garrett, Rachel Harmon, Christy E. Lopez, Tracey L. Meares, Maria Ponomarenko, Christopher Slobogin & Tom R. Tyler, Changing the Law to Change Policing: First Steps, Just. Collaboratory (June 2020), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/justice/document/change_to_change_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V6H-PGST]; Amna Akbar, Monica Bell, Dorothy Roberts & Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Reform: Reenvisioning the Role of Police, YouTube (June 24, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qGXVSg5EjdI [https://perma.cc/AP98-F3FY]; and Monica Bell, Allegra McLeod, Jamelia Morgan, Anthony O’Rourke & Rick Su, Defunding the Police: A Conversation, U. Buff. Sch. Law (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.law.buffalo.edu/news/defunding-the-police.html [https://perma.cc/7YB3-35MC].

16

[16] Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 405, 416 (2018) (“The rebellions in Ferguson and Baltimore . . . and the accompanying swell of Black-led organizing, forced hard-charging conversations about law, the police, and the state—routine conversations in communities of color that are relatively absent in legal scholarship—onto the national stage, changing the debate over race in the United States.” (footnote omitted)).

17

[17]. Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 Geo. L.J. 1419, 1475 (2016) (“I want to support a frame alignment around the term ‘Third Reconstruction . . . .’”); I. Bennett Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and Policing in the Year 2044, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 59-60 (2019) (“How do we make a reality what CRT scholars and fellow travelers have long called for, a Third Reconstruction that would ‘merge “we” and “they” while eliminating the role that whiteness and blackness play in determining who belongs and who does not’?” (footnote omitted) (quoting Lisa A. Crooms-Robinson, Is the Third Time the Charm? Reconstructing Personhood and Reimagining “We the People, 43 Hum. Rts. 28, 31 (2018)); Tracey Meares, A Third Reconstruction?, Balkinization (Aug. 14, 2015), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/08/a-third-reconstruction.html [https://perma.cc/UAC5-877W] (“Once we have [a] system in which the formal and hidden curricula are the same for everyone we will have achieved the goal of the Third Reconstruction.”); see also Capers, supra, at 59 n.323, 60 nn.324-30 (collecting sources of Critical Race Theory (CRT) scholars who have linked CRT to the idea of a Third Reconstruction).

18

[18]. See Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 650, 677-84 (2020).

19

[19]. See Barry Friedman, Disaggregating the Policing Function, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 26-52), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3564469 [https://perma.cc/Q8EF-WZ3S].

20

[20]. See Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 1782, 1832-39 (2020).

21

[21]. See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional Law of Punishment, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1437, 1452-53 (2017); Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 1595, 1655-62 (2016); Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1827, 1889-1907 (2015); Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1455, 1464-65, 1483-86 (2017); Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 Wake Forest L. Rev. 793, 798 (2016); Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, 114 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 20-45 (2019); Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 91, 134-51 (2016); see also Symposium, Democratizing Criminal Law, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1367 (2017) (a collection of essays on the theme of democratizing criminal law); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 761, 809-16 (2012) (urging legal scholars to study the regulation of policing by analyzing the comparative advantages of various regulating institutions beyond courts and constitutional rights).

22

[22]. Compare, e.g., Paul Butler, Chokehold: Policing Black Men 229-47 (2017) (pushing toward the abolition of policing), with Tracey L. Meares, Synthesizing Narratives of Policing and Making a Case for Policing as a Public Good, 63 St. Louis U. L.J. 553, 558-62 (2019) (describing how policing can be transformed to serve as a legitimate public good using principles of procedural justice).

23

[23]. Cf. Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 Ind. L.J. 811, 835-36 (2006) (explaining reparations and what they are designed to accomplish); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323, 394 (1987) (“Reparations . . . is a concept directed at remedying wrongs committed against the powerless.”).

24

[24]. See generally Amy E. Lerman & Vesla M. Weaver, Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control 64-69 (2014) (describing the erosion of citizens’ power to hold police officers and departments accountable); Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 Yale L.J. 2054, 2067 (2017) (“[A]t both an interactional and structural level, current regimes can operate to effectively banish whole communities from the body politic.”).

25

[25]. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1472-73 (2004); see also Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 108, 157 (1976) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause should prohibit laws that “impair[] the status of a specially disadvantaged group”).

26

[26]. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1609, 1612, 1623-24 (2017).

27

[27]. Cf. Egon Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors, Current Practices, and Possible Role Models 38-39 (1970) (describing policing as primarily about the imposition of force); Harmon, supra note 21, at 762 (“Police officers are granted immense authority by the state to impose harm.”); Alice Ristroph, The Thin Blue Line from Crime to Punishment, 108 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 305, 306-07 (2018) (describing the role of force inherent to the nature of policing).

28

[28]. See, e.g., Rachel Elise Barkow, Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle of Mass Incarceration 165-85 (2019); Ponomarenko, supra note 21, at 41-44; cf. John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 759 nn.276-78, 760 nn.279-82 (2020) (collecting studies showing that laypeople can be punitive, in contrast to the view that democratizing criminal adjudication will lead to leniency).

29

[29]. See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga & David L. Weisburd, Policing Problem Places: Crime Hot Spots and Effective Prevention 99-151 (2010) (describing the importance of focusing on “evidence-based” police practices); Brandon L. Garrett, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice, 86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1490, 1493 (2018) (“Evidence-informed practices refer to a family of approaches that have brought greater use of data and science into the criminal justice system.”).

30

[30]. For more on this methodology, see Amna Akbar, Sameer Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 40-54), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3735538 [https://perma.cc/4TTY-NRS3].

31

[31]. See Matsuda, supra note 23, at 324 (“Looking to the bottom—adopting the perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise—can assist critical scholars in the task of fathoming the phenomenology of law and defining the elements of justice.”); cf. Richard Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities: Innovation and Response, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1193, 1204 (2008) (book review) (discussing how looking to the responses of subordinated communities to policing can help unearth new ways of thinking about policing).

32

[32]. Cf. Monica C. Bell, The Community in Community Justice: Subordination, Consumption, Resistance, and Transformation, 16 Du Bois Rev. 197, 210 (2019) (“[M]embers of marginalized communities who seem similarly situated can simultaneously have multiple types of relationships with the crime control apparatus.”); Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of “Community, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 343, 348 (describing how the term “the community” in its different forms “can mask fundamental ambiguities of group definition . . . or serious political conflicts within what otherwise seems a determinate group”). This is especially true when describing “community” solely by artificial geographical boundaries. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1841, 1844 (1994) (describing the “oppressive and disempowering” nature of boundary-drawing in the context of racial segregation sanctioned by local governments); Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 371, 403-59 (2001) (arguing that defining “communities” within local boundaries gives priority to certain privileged decisionmakers over others, and can actually be exclusionary).

33

[33]. See Peter Hermann & Clarence Williams, On a D.C. Street Beset by Gun Violence, Calls to Fix Policing, Not Defund It, Wash. Post (July 10, 2020, 7:29 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/on-a-dc-street-beset-by-gun-violence-calls-to-fix-policing-not-defund-it/2020/07/10/350f46de-c143-11ea-b4f6-cb39cd8940fb_story.html [https://perma.cc/5QAK-4YN8]; Jeffrey C. Mays, Who Opposes Defunding the N.Y.P.D.? These Black Lawmakers, N.Y. Times (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/10/nyregion/defund-police-nyc-council.html [https://perma.cc/8BLA-A2PQ].

34

[34]. See Rappaport, supra note 28, at 759-60 (collecting studies of lay opinions of punishment questioning the lenience of lay people); cf. James Forman, Jr., Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America 10-11 (2017) (documenting how residents of Washington, D.C., promoted “tough on crime” policies when faced with a lack of other options); Kate Levine, Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts, 98 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) (describing how Black Lives Matter and other movement groups do not speak with one voice with regard to “punitive instincts”).

35

[35]. Cf. James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior 227-29 (1978) (describing the limited effects of local-community involvement and even local politics on the everyday behavior of policing); Barbara Armacost, The Organizational Reasons Police Departments Don’t Change, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Aug. 19, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/08/the-organizational-reasons-police-departments-dont-change [https://perma.cc/4X4U-6E7B] (arguing for the necessity of top-down police reform).

36

[36]. For extended analyses of the movement push to abolish the police, see, for example, Akbar, supra note 20; V. Noah Gimbel & Craig Muhammad, Are Police Obsolete? Breaking Cycles of Violence Through Abolition Democracy, 40 Cardozo L. Rev. 1453, 1527-42 (2019); Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1613, 1617-37 (2019), which describes abolitionist efforts in Chicago that center on policing; and Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-29 (2019), which describes the abolitionist analysis of the origins of policing within slave patrols and other deliberate state means of oppressing Black Americans.

37

[37]. See About Us, Movement for Black Lives, https://m4bl.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/L4TN-PZAA].

38

[38]. See, e.g., About People’s Budget LA, People’s Budget LA, https://peoplesbudgetla.com/about [https://perma.cc/D9NA-9TXP] (describing how a coalition of organizations in Los Angeles has been fighting for five years to present an alternative vision of public safety in which the city spends money on public services rather than policing); see Zach Norris, We Keep Us Safe: Building Secure, Just, and Inclusive Communities 63-99 (2020) (describing community efforts for mutual aid and protection in Oakland).

39

[39]. See, e.g., Enough Is Enough! A 150 Year Performance Review of the Minneapolis Police Department, MPD150 (2017), https://www.mpd150.com/wp-content/themes/mpd150/assets/mpd150_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNT9-MP7L]; Solutions, Agenda Build Black Futures, https://www.agendatobuildblackfutures.com/solutions [https://perma.cc/5W2D-PQSG] (connecting demand to “[r]educe police budgets and reallocate residual funds to the people’s vision of public safety” to the demands to honor workers’ rights, value women’s work, and promote trans health); Vision for Black Lives, Movement for Black Lives, https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms [https://perma.cc/VQR4-29TN] (connecting demands for community control of both policing and schools to the push to equalize political power); see also Rahman & Simonson, supra note 10, at 693-99 (describing how contemporary movement visions of change concentrate on counteracting long-term structural inequalities created by or facilitated by the state).

40

[40]. Compare, e.g., Beth Richie, Dylan Rodríguez, Mariame Kaba, Melissa Burch, Rachel Herzing & Shana Agid, Problems with Community Control of Police and Proposals for Alternatives, Community Resource Hub (Sept. 2020), https://drive.google.com/file/d/12q4eWZQzwIj-EFrLUU2XbnLipKnXIuxG/view [https://perma.cc/8KT6-A4ZC] (presenting a critical analysis of community control of the police from an abolitionist lens), with Max Rameau & Netfa Freeman, Community Control vs. Defunding the Police: A Critical Analysis, Black Agenda Rep. (June 10, 2020), https://www.blackagendareport.com/community-control-vs-defunding-police-critical-analysis [https://perma.cc/5YJA-G7H4] (arguing that defunding the police will not shift power and lead to abolition in the way that instituting community control of the police would).

41

[41]. See 8 to Abolition: Abolitionist Policy Changes to Demand from Your City Officials, 8 to Abolition coalition, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5edbf321b6026b073fef97d4/t/5ee0817c955eaa484011b8fe/1591771519433/8toAbolition_V2.pdf [https://perma.cc/UN7B-CPDX] (“As abolitionists, we recognize that reforms that do not reduce the power of the police . . . simply create new opportunities to surveil, police, and incarcerate Black, brown, indigenous, poor, disabled, trans, gender oppressed, queer, migrant people, and those who work in street economies.”); cf. Amna A. Akbar, Demands for a Democratic Political Economy, 134 Harv. L. Rev. F. 90, 98-106 (2020) (describing building power as one of three central hallmarks of “non-reformist reforms”); Marbre Stahly-Butts & Amna A. Akbar, Transformative Reforms, Abolitionist Demands, Stan. J. C.R.-C.L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2-3) (on file with author) (explaining how for abolitionist social movements, one of the five requirements of a transformative reform—a reform that supports the goal of abolition—is “whether the reform builds or shifts power”).

 


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