Disenrollment as Citizenship Revocation: Promoting Tribal Sovereignty by Embracing International Norms
abstract. This Note argues that Indian tribes can best address disenrollment by viewing the problem through the lens of international norms regarding citizenship revocation. Tribal officials and members, advocates and journalists, and scholars and practitioners of federal Indian law typically understand disenrollment, which is when a tribe severs its governmental relationship with certain members, as a practice unique to Indian Country. However, while tribes’ unique legal status facilitates disenrollment, this practice can nevertheless be understood as a form of citizenship revocation, which is when a state deprives certain persons of their previously held citizenship. By understanding disenrollment as citizenship revocation, tribes can draw from a wide body of existing literature about states’ citizenship-revocation regimes when considering limitations on their power to disenroll. If tribes choose to address disenrollment by embracing international norms regarding citizenship revocation, they will not simply invoke tribal sovereignty, as sometimes occurs under the current status quo, but instead promote it by advancing good governance and aligning their sovereignty with state sovereignty.
author. J.D. expected 2025, Yale Law School; B.A. 2022, Yale College; enrolled member, Forest County Potawatomi Community. I thank Professor Gerald Torres for his encouragement and guidance as I developed this Note. I also thank Lexie Holden and Ronak Gandhi for their suggestions at different stages of drafting, as well as Jeff and Mary Beth Crawford for their support as I developed and refined my ideas. Finally, I am deeply grateful to Chase Hinman, Lily Moore-Eissenberg, Beatrice L. Brown, Deja R. Morehead, Shreya Minama Reddy, and the rest of the Yale Law Journal for improving this Note through their excellent feedback and assistance during the publication process. All views, errors, and omissions in this Note are my own.
Introduction
In 2022, the Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians, one of 574 federally recognized Indian tribes,1 terminated its governmental relationship with sixty to seventy of its members.2 This action was ostensibly the result of a constitutional dispute over whether the descendants of certain Chukchansi Indians were entitled to tribal membership.3 Shortly before resigning, however, the Tribe’s attorney wrote that these individuals should remain members under “the plain language of the Tribe’s Constitution.”4 Regardless, on the eve of a Tribal Council election, the Picayune Rancheria’s Tribal Council and Enrollment Committee disenrolled a substantial portion of the Tribe’s membership.5
The Picayune Rancheria’s 2022 expulsion of many of its members was not an isolated incident. The Tribe began removing members in 19926 and was still doing so as recently as November 2023.7 Furthermore, many other federally recognized tribes engage in similar practices, creating what critics have labeled a disenrollment epidemic.8 In Indian Country,9 the term “disenrollment” describes a tribe terminating its governmental relationship with one or more of its members.10 Over the past few decades, disenrollment has stripped the heritage of thousands of Native Americans across the country.11 Those disenrolled face negative health impacts, direct financial loss, and denial of access to social, educational, and economic opportunities.12
In recent years, various scholars and journalists have criticized tribes that engage in disenrollment.13 Opponents of disenrollment highlight the practice’s considerable normative weaknesses and practical problems. As a normative matter, disenrollment raises questions regarding political accountability, fundamental fairness, and human rights.14 In practice, disenrollment can undermine the legitimacy of tribal governments and institutions, weaken the rule of law in Indian Country, and endanger tribal business ventures.15
Tribes engaging in disenrollment often invoke tribal sovereignty and Indian self-determination to defend their actions.16 Many in Indian Country equate criticism of disenrollment to criticism of these two concepts.17 Because tribal sovereignty and Indian self-determination are vitally important to Indian Country, many key voices have hesitated to take a firm position regarding disenrollment.18 This Note, however, argues that tribes can confront the problem of disenrollment without returning to past federal paternalism by looking beyond Indian Country for solutions.
Understanding how disenrollment implicates tribal sovereignty
and Indian self-determination requires understanding what each of these
concepts represents. “Tribal sovereignty” describes tribes’ inherent “ability
to govern and to protect and enhance the health, safety, and welfare of [their]
tribal citizens within [their] tribal territory.”19 Tribes’ sovereignty is derived from
their historical status as independent political communities rather than from
the U.S. Constitution or a federal delegation of
power.20 As explained
by Felix S. Cohen, a central figure to twentieth-century Native American
history and the development of the field of federal Indian law,21 “[p]erhaps the most basic principle
of all Indian law” is that tribal powers are “not, in general, delegated powers
granted by express acts of Congress” but instead “inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”22
Today, however, tribal sovereignty is limited by the United States’s plenary power over Indian affairs.23 The Supreme Court has explained that “Congress’s power to legislate with respect to the Indian tribes [is] ‘plenary and exclusive’”24 and “supersed[es] both tribal and state authority.”25 Although “the federal government did not give tribal sovereignty to Indian tribes,” the federal government is the ultimate authority on how tribes can functionally exert their sovereignty.26
While much of tribal sovereignty and its limitations are presently defined by federal law,27 Indian self-determination is a matter of federal policy.28 Specifically, Indian self-determination is the federal policy that has defined the United States’s relationship with Indian tribes since the late 1960s.29 In 1970, President Richard Nixon proposed to create “a new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.”30 In the present Self-Determination Era, the federal government strives for Indian tribes to “have autonomy and the opportunity to operate programs and services themselves.”31 In the words of the Biden Administration, over “the last 50 years . . . the Federal Government has worked with Tribal Nations to promote and support Tribal self-governance and the growth of Tribal institutions.”32 The policy of Indian self-determination has continued for more than half a century because it “is the only policy that produces positive results.”33
The advent of the Self-Determination Era did not create tribal sovereignty, but it has enabled tribes to better exercise tribal sovereignty as compared to earlier paternalistic eras of federal-tribal relations.34 An example of the relationship between tribal sovereignty and Indian self-determination is Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez—a case that is also key to understanding disenrollment.35 Julia Martinez was a female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo whose children were ineligible for tribal membership because of a tribal “ordinance denying membership to the children of certain female tribal members.”36 Martinez claimed that this ordinance violated the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) of 1968,37 which provides that “[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.”38 But ICRA “does not expressly authorize the bringing of civil actions for declaratory or injunctive relief to enforce its substantive provisions” in federal court.39
The Supreme Court first determined that “[s]uits against [tribes] under the ICRA are barred by [tribal] sovereign immunity.”40 The Martinez Court then rejected the argument that ICRA created an implicit civil cause of action against tribal officials.41 In enacting ICRA, Congress had “[t]wo distinct and competing purposes . . . : In addition to its objective of strengthening the position of individual tribal members vis-à-vis the tribe, Congress also intended to promote the well-established federal ‘policy of furthering Indian self-government.’”42 A federal civil cause of action would harm the second purpose by “undermin[ing] the authority of tribal forums [and] impos[ing] serious financial burdens” on tribes.43 Moreover, the Court noted that “[a] tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community,” and the federal judiciary “should not rush to . . . intrude on these delicate matters.”44
Martinez acknowledged Indian tribes’ authority to make membership decisions without oversight from federal courts based on principles of tribal sovereignty and Indian self-determination.45 This decision is key to understanding disenrollment because tribes’ sovereign “right to define . . . membership”46 intuitively seems like it should include not just the power to enroll, but also the power to disenroll. Many opponents of disenrollment even concede this point.47 Others emphasize that the histories and traditions of North American Indigenous peoples do not support disenrollment and therefore argue that disenrollment is fundamentally a colonial power originating from the United States, not an Indigenous one.48 But even accepting that tribes have an inherent power to disenroll, they are not required to exercise this power: tribes are free to restrict disenrollment in their constitutions, ordinances, or courts. But what a government can do, it can also undo, and so there is a clear need for limiting principles on the power to disenroll.
Although some scholars and practitioners of federal Indian law have made “calls for outside influence” to halt disenrollments, tribes’ internal responses are critical because disenrollment, regardless of its origins, is fundamentally a tribal issue.49 In particular, there is a need for effective tribal responses to disenrollment that go beyond invoking tribal sovereignty as a shield against criticism.50 Given the realities of the plenary-power doctrine, “[e]xpansions of tribal sovereignty . . . must be earned.”51 By addressing disenrollment directly, tribes can therefore demonstrate the merits of a broader conception of tribal sovereignty.
Tribes that decide to address disenrollment internally could benefit from looking beyond Indian Country for answers to many of the questions raised by this power. International norms and literature regarding citizenship revocation are particularly instructive regarding whether, when, and how disenrollment might be justified. By embracing restrictions on their power to disenroll in line with restrictions on states’ power to revoke citizenship, tribes can both exhibit that tribal sovereignty is akin to state sovereignty and demonstrate that tribal sovereignty deserves to be treated with the same degree of seriousness as state sovereignty.
As a practical matter, tribal sovereignty is clearly distinct from state sovereignty.52 Tribal advocates, however, frequently equate the two as both a rhetorical device and a vision of their ideal state of affairs.53 This comparison presumably appeals to many in Indian Country because states, in the international sense of the term, can take actions that tribes cannot, such as exerting jurisdiction over all noncitizens who are within their territory and engaging in independent foreign policy.54 But less discussed in Indian Country is that the rights inherent to statehood are also accompanied by certain duties that exist even in the absence of clear enforcement mechanisms.55
Since the Second World War, international law and norms surrounding citizenship have focused on protections for citizens even where such protections conflict with historical ideas of absolute state sovereignty.56 Under the modern conception of state sovereignty, the powers of national governments are limited in theory, if not always in practice, by certain “human rights and fundamental freedoms.”57 Today, therefore, states do not generally assert an unchecked power to remove citizens from their political communities.58
The global War on Terror has forced Western democracies to reckon with “whether certain citizens deserve the protection that citizenship status provides.”59 Scholars focused on citizenship generally use the term “citizenship revocation” to describe states’ efforts to rescind, annul, or otherwise deprive disfavored individuals of previous grants of citizenship.60 The related term “denaturalization” specifically describes the revocation of citizenship obtained through immigration and application rather than through birth.61
States with active citizenship-revocation regimes frequently justify their actions through national-security rationales, the idea that citizenship revocation is a just punishment for certain crimes, or a contractual understanding of citizenship.62 But international law and norms can constrain these states’ power to revoke citizenship.63 Furthermore, some citizenship-revocation literature has questioned whether states may wield such power at all.64 Constraints on states’ power to revoke citizenship and the discourse surrounding exertions of this power problematize the idea that tribes should fully exercise an unbounded power to disenroll.65
This Note examines how tribes can address the problem of disenrollment in a manner that does not simply invoke tribal sovereignty but promotes it. Part I summarizes existing literature on disenrollment. The focus of this review is current disenrollment efforts and their implications, leaving discussion of the historical development of the practice to existing works.66 Part II explains that tribal membership is a form of citizenship despite its distinctive aspects and claims that disenrollment can therefore be understood as a form of citizenship revocation. Part III explains why tribes should look to international norms regarding citizenship revocation when addressing disenrollment. Finally, Part IV describes how tribes might choose to apply these norms to limit disenrollment.
The international norms on citizenship revocation reviewed in this Note indicate that some rationales for disenrollment are more legitimate than others. These norms do not support disenrollment on the grounds of lack of blood quantum, one of the most common reasons that tribes give when engaging in disenrollment,67 suggesting that tribes should cease or severely restrict this practice. But disenrollment may be permissible in narrow circumstances on the grounds of fraud and perhaps dual enrollment. If such circumstances arise, however, tribes engaging in disenrollment must aim to meet a high burden of proof given that they are upsetting the status quo and damaging existing interests for often-unclear benefit.
Carmen Kohlruss, ‘Used and Abused.’ Chukchansi Looks to Oust Members on Election Eve as Casino Profits Soar, Fresno Bee (Sept. 30, 2022, 10:21 AM), https://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/article266513506.html [https://perma.cc/NZ68-JS4Q]; Yesenia Amaro, ‘Corrupt Political Favoritism.’ Chukchansi Kick 49 Members Out of Tribe, More Targeted, Fresno Bee (Apr. 16, 2023, 9:10 AM), https://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/article274101165.html [https://perma.cc/K3NF-RWPW].
Kohlruss, supra note 2; see Const. of the Picayune Reservation art. 3, § 1, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6172090-Chukchansi-tribal-constitution [https://perma.cc/T98G-NLHD].
Id.; Yesenia Amaro, ‘We Need Help.’ More Chukchansi Members Targeted for Removal, Have Benefits Suspended, Fresno Bee (Jan. 26, 2023, 2:41 PM), https://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/article271259182.html [https://perma.cc/VY2J-32TQ].
Amaro, supra note 5; Amaro, supra note 2; Marco Rosas, Chukchansi Using ‘Paper Genocide’ for More Casino Money, Former Council Members Say, Your Cent. Valley (June 17, 2024, 9:06 AM PDT), https://www.yourcentralvalley.com/news/chukchansi-using-paper-genocide-for-more-casino-money-former-council-members-say [https://perma.cc/UG8Q-S6X5].
Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Curing the Tribal Disenrollment Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 383, 385-87 (2015); see, e.g., Gabriel S. Galanda, Disenrollment Is a Tool of the Colonizers, ICT News (Sept. 12, 2018), https://ictnews.org/archive/disenrollment-is-a-tool-of-the-colonizers [https://perma.cc/AVC5-WNFJ]; Cecily Hilleary, Native American Tribal Disenrollment Reaching Epidemic Levels, Voice of Am. (Mar. 3, 2017, 10:38 AM), https://www.voanews.com/a/native-american-tribal-disenrollment-reaching-epidemic-levels/3748192.html [https://perma.cc/J5RG-99PS]; Wilkins & Wilkins, supra note 6, at 67-71.
“Indian country” is a term that has both a legal meaning and a colloquial meaning. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2018) (defining the term “Indian country” as used in a particular chapter of the United States Code); NCAI Response to Usage of the Term, “Indian Country,” NCAI (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.ncai.org/news/ncai-response-to-usage-of-the-term-indian-country [https://perma.cc/TP3E-4EDZ] (“[T]he term ‘Indian Country’ is leveraged broadly as a general description of Native spaces and places within the United States . . . .”). Generally, “Indian country” with a lowercase “c” signifies that the term is being used in the legal sense, while “Indian Country” with an uppercase “C” signifies that the term is being used in the colloquial sense, although this is not a universally consistent or coherent distinction. See NCAI Response to Usage of the Term, supra; Andrew Huff, What Is Indian Country?: Uncertain About the Term “Indian Country”? Read This, Ctr. for Indian Country Dev. 1 (Oct. 2023), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/-/media/assets/indiancountry/what-is-indian-country/cicd-what-is-indian-country.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYL2-S8WX]. This Note refers to “Indian Country” in the colloquial sense and adheres to the aforementioned capitalization convention.
See, e.g., Disenrollment Background Papers and Resolutions, Ass’n Am. Indian Physicians (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.aaip.org/news/disenrollment-background-papers-and-resolution [https://perma.cc/KR9M-C33U]; Hilleary, supra note 8.
See, e.g., Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 8, at 383-86; Wilkins & Wilkins, supra note 6, at 5; Marquez, supra note 10, at 207-11; Hilleary, supra note 8; Jaime Dunaway, The Fight Over Who’s a “Real Indian,” Slate (June 12, 2018, 4:05 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/native-american-disenrollments-are-waning-after-decades-of-tribes-stripping-citizenship-from-members.html [https://perma.cc/NPC5-5QKT].
See, e.g., Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 8, at 388-89; Greg Rubio, Reclaiming Indian Civil Rights: The Application of International Rights Law to Tribal Disenrollment Actions, 11 Or. Rev. Int’l L. 1, 3 (2009); Resolution # 2015-06, Supporting Equal Protection and Due Process for Any Divestment of the American Indigenous Right of Tribal Citizenship, Nat’l Native Am. Bar Ass’n 2 (Apr. 8, 2015) [hereinafter NNABA Resolution], https://www.nativeamericanbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2015-04-09-2015-06-NNABA-Resolution-Due-Process.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ASJ-FDGR].
See, e.g., Anthony Broadman & Jared Miller, Disenrollment Is Bad for the Bottom Line: Redux, ICT News (Sept. 12, 2018), https://ictnews.org/archive/disenrollment-is-bad-for-the-bottom-line-redux [https://perma.cc/5R6M-PMSH]; Disenrollment Background Papers and Resolutions, supra note 12; Cedric Sunray, Disenrollment Clubs, ICT News (Sept. 12, 2018), https://ictnews.org/archive/disenrollment-clubs [https://perma.cc/2RPX-63GA].
See, e.g., Daniel Beekman, United Nations Watchdogs Raise Concerns About Nooksack Evictions, Again, Seattle Times (May 20, 2023, 6:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/united-nations-watchdogs-raise-concerns-about-nooksack-evictions-again [https://perma.cc/X5LV-PF9W] (“‘All nations have the right to govern themselves and establish their own laws and membership, and sovereign Tribes are no different,’ the [Nooksack Tribal Council] said. ‘Tribes may require tribal membership for certain programs. Ignoring this fundamental right undermines Tribal self-determination and the government-to-government relationship between Tribes and the United States.’”); Amanda Peacher, Tribal Court Reverses Grand Ronde Disenrollment Decision, Or. Pub. Broad. (Aug. 8, 2016, 8:15 PM), https://www.opb.org/news/article/grand-ronde-disenrollment-decision-reversed-chief-tumulth [https://perma.cc/HK49-EXC6] (indicating that the Chairman of the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde (CTGR) described the Court of Appeals of the CTGR’s reversal of “a decision . . . to disenroll 66 tribal members” as “a huge infringement on our Tribal sovereignty”).
See NCAI, Rep. Deb Haaland Each Break Disenrollment Silence, Galanda Broadman (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.galandabroadman.com/blog/2020/8/ncai-rep-deb-haaland-each-break-disenrollment-silence [https://perma.cc/5GRQ-437Q].
Tribal Nations and the United States: An Introduction, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians 23 (Feb. 2020), https://archive.ncai.org/tribalnations/introduction/Indian_Country_101_Updated_February_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQL4-4HV5].
See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 440, 442 (2005); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”).
As a legal matter, the plenary-power doctrine is well established in case law and constitutionally grounded via the Indian Commerce Clause, the Treaty Clause, and “principles inherent in the Constitution’s structure.”Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 272-74 (2023). As a historical matter, the plenary-power doctrine rose to prominence during the height of the United States’s efforts to displace and erase Indigenous peoples and has been frequently used to legitimize these efforts. See id. at 327-29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“It is no coincidence either that this Court’s plenary-power jurisprudence emerged in the same era as Indian boarding schools and other assimilationist policies.”).
Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55-57. But see Haaland, 599 U.S. at 330 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Yes, Tribes retain the inherent sovereignty the Constitution left for them. But no, Congress does not possess power to ‘calibrate “the metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.”’” (quoting Lara, 541 U.S. at 214-15 (2004)).
See id.; Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on the Problems of the American Indians: “The Forgotten American.” (March 6, 1968), in 1 Public Papers of The President of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, January 1 to June 30, 1968, at 335, 336 (1970); Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs (July 8, 1970), in Public Papers of the President of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970, at 564, 564 (1971); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, §§ 2-3, 88 Stat. 2203, 2203-04 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450, 450a); Exec. Order No. 14,112, 3 C.F.R. 703, 703-04 (2024).
Lina Mann, “Self Determination Without Termination”: President Richard M. Nixon’s Approach to Native American Policy Reform, White House Hist. Ass’n (Nov. 3, 2021), https://http://www.whitehousehistory.org/self-determination-without-termination [https://perma.cc/538D-4JLD]; see also Bureau of Indian Affs., Federal Law and Indian Policy Overview: History of Indian Law and Policy, U.S. Dep’t Interior, https://www.bia.gov/bia/history/IndianLawPolicy [https://perma.cc/MEX6-T49Y] (listing “The Self-Determination Era” as a period of federal Indian policy).
Patrice H. Kunesh, The Power of Self-Determination in Building Sustainable Economies in Indian Country, Econ. Pol’y Inst. 1 (June 15, 2022), https://files.epi.org/uploads/270697.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9UP-XDBT] (discussing Indian self-determination in the context of economic development); see also Geoff Strommer & Kirke Kickingbird, Indian Self-Determination: Four Decades of Extraordinary Success, 40 Hum. Rts., no. 2, 2015, at 2, 2 (“By all accounts, tribal self-determination has become the most successful bipartisan Indian policy ever enacted by Congress.”).
See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-66, 72 (1978) (explaining that one of Congress’s purposes in enacting the Indian Civil Right Acts (ICRA) of 1968 was promoting Indian self-determination and therefore declining to adopt an interpretation of ICRA that would create an “additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty” in the absence of clear congressional intent).
Id. at 59. The Supreme Court noted that tribes are “separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution” which are not inherently subject to “those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.” Id. at 56. In enacting ICRA, however, Congress exerted its “plenary authority” to “impos[e] certain restrictions upon tribal governments similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 56-57. But “[n]othing on the face of Title I of the ICRA purports to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief,” nor can Title III of ICRA, which provides for a habeas corpus action, “be read as a general waiver of the tribe’s sovereign immunity.” Id. at 59.
See id. at 72 (“[U]nless and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication . . . in a federal forum would represent, we are constrained to find that [ICRA] does not impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe or its officers.”).
See, e.g., Wilkins & Wilkins, supra note 6, at 5; Kevin K. Washburn, What the Future Holds: The Changing Landscape of Federal Indian Policy, 130 Harv. L. Rev. F. 200, 229 (2017); Eric Reitman, Note, An Argument for the Partial Abrogation of Federally Recognized Indian Tribes’ Sovereign Power over Membership, 92 Va. L. Rev. 793, 798-99 (2006).
Id. at 15 (“Unless the American Constitution is amended dramatically, Indian tribes will never be equivalent to states or foreign nations.”); see also Cohen, supra note 22, § 6.02 (demonstrating that although Indian tribes have been historically recognized as independent political entities, their powers have also been subjected to important federal limitations, such as those stemming from ICRA); Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 256-57 (2023) (“In a long line of cases, we have characterized Congress’s power to legislate with respect to Indian tribes as ‘“plenary and exclusive”’ Our cases leave little doubt that Congress’s power in this field is muscular, superseding both tribal and state authority.” (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004))).
See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (“Indian tribes can no longer freely alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy. They cannot enter into direct commercial or governmental relations with foreign nations. And, as we have recently held, they cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts.” (citations omitted)).
See, e.g., Macklin, supra note 58, at 2-3; Shai Lavi, Punishment and the Revocation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom, United States, and Israel, 13 New Crim. L. Rev. 404, 409 (2010); Elke Winter & Ivana Previsic, Citizenship Revocation in the Mainstream Press: A Case of Re-Ethnicization?, 42 Canadian J. Socio. 55, 55 (2017).