Joshua C. Macey
Bankruptcy by Another Name
A recent essay in this Journal critiques bankruptcy for limiting the litigation system’s ability to promote noneconomic public-policy goals. This Response argues that bankruptcy can and does further these public values, and that it is reasonably easy to tweak bankruptcy law to accommodate these goals more effectively.
Open Access, Interoperability, and DTCC’s Unexpected Path to Monopoly
This Article argues that open-access and interoperability requirements helped the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation monopolize U.S. securities clearing and depository markets. DTCC’s path to monopoly offers a cautionary tale for policymakers seeking to use open access and interoperability to curb industry consolidation in Big Tech, social media, and elsewhere.
Dodd-Frank Is a Pigouvian Regulation
Although commentators have criticized Dodd-Frank for not solving the problem of "too big to fail" banks, this Note identifies one promising feature of the law. As a "Pigouvian regulation," Dodd-Frank imposed compliance costs that incentivized banks to divest risky assets while providing regulators the flexibility to tailor the legal regime.